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Of the four million infants born in the United States each
year, approximately five percent, or 200,000, are afflicted with
disabling, hereditary birth defects.' In order to alleviate the
emotional burdens on parents, the suffering and death of af-
fected children, and the social cost of caring for those unable
to care for themselves, biomedical science is exploring the
means by which hereditary diseases may be reduced or elimi-
nated. One currently available technology is amniocentesis-a
procedure whereby fetal genetic defects are diagnosed through
'Two hundred fifty thousand defective infants are born annually. However,
20% (approximately 50,000) of these abnormal births are caused by environmen-
tal factors during pregnancy-drugs, disease (rubella), or radiation. An addi-
tional 60% of all birth defects result from the interaction between environment
and heredity; and 20% are attributed to inherited genetic defects alone. Stock,
Will the Baby Be Normal?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 82, col. 3.
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intrauterine testing. Amniocentesis is normally used today in
conjunction with abortion; someday the alternative of prenatal
therapy may be generally available. "The advent of prenatal
diagnosis through amniocentesis represents the most impor-
tant advance so far attained in the prevention of the births of
infants with irreparable genetic mental defect and fatal genetic
disease."
2
Philosophers and scientists have considered the ramifica-
tions of amniocentesis, 3 but the courts and legislatures have
been silent. There has not yet been a case involving prenatal
testing, nor does there seem to be sufficient public aware-
ness to foment legislative action. 4 Our legal institutions, how-
ever, cannot long remain mute. The burgeoning use of amnio-
centesis will eventually give rise to proposals that the state or
federal government regulate the conditions under which the
procedure may, perhaps must, be performed. Moreover, the
continued use of prenatal testing will undoubtedly generate
malpractice litigation,5 perhaps even including actions for
wrongful life.
This Article will describe amniocentesis, suggest possible
statutory approaches to prenatal diagnosis, discuss the policy
and constitutional conflicts which such legislation might pro-
voke, and explore a possible malpractice action for wrong-
ful life.
2 Milunsky, Littlefield, Kanfer, Kolodny, Shih, & Atkins, Prenatal Genetic Diag-
nosis, 283 NEW ENG. J. MED. (pt. 3) 1498, 1503 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Milunsky part 3].
3 See, e.g., ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS: GENETIC COUNSELING AND THE
USE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (Fogarty Int'l Center Proceedings No. 13, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM]; EARLY DIAGNOSIS OF HUMAN GENETIC
DEFECTS: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS (Fogarty Int'l Center Proceed-
ings No. 6, 1971) [hereinafter cited as EARLY DIAGNOSIS SYMPOSIUM].
4 See generally Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and Possi-
bilities, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 480 (1968).
- Amniocentesis may also prove useful in prenatal determination of paternity.
For example, a woman who has been raped may want to abort a fetus if the father
is the rapist, but carry it if the father is her husband. In a Swedish case, the woman
wanted to ascertain whether the father was her husband or her lover; see Brody,
Analysis of Cells of a Fetus Settles a Paternity Dispute, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1972,
at 79, col. 1.
Postnatal genetic analysis may someday prove useful in paternity litigation.
See generally Krause, Scientific Evidence and the Ascertainment of Paternity, 5 FAM.
L.Q. 252, 270-73 (1971). Since antenatal judicial determinations of paternity
should rarely, if ever, be necessary, amniocentetic determinations of paternity
should be excluded from evidence because of the possibility of erroneous diag-
noses. See text accompanying notes 65-68 infra.
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I. AMNIOCENTESIS-ITS METHODOLOGY, FUNCTIONS,
POSSIBILITIES, AND RISKS
A. Toward an Understanding of Amniocentesis
The word amniocentesis is derived from the Greek amnion,
the membrane around the fetus, and kentesis, to puncture. The
procedure consists of the perforation of the uterus and the
subsequent removal of amniotic fluid produced very early in
pregnancy. Comprised in part of fetal cells, this fluid is cul-
tured and analyzed to determine certain genetic characteris-
tics of the fetus.
6
Amniocentesis emerged as a diagnostic aid in practical
obstetrics in the middle of the 1950's, 7 when it was discovered
that analysis of amniotic fluid cells could facilitate the determi-
nation of fetal sex.8 Pregnancies "at risk" for a sex-linked genet-
ic disorder-which is transmitted from the carrier mother to
about half of her male offspring 9 -could be identified through
amniocentesis, and subsequently terminated by abortion.' 0
Since about half of the male offspring born to a mother carry-
ing a gene for a sex-linked condition are unaffected by the
disease, however, it must be assumed that those pregnancies
which were selectively terminated in the earls 1960's resulted
in the abortion of healthy male fetuses along with those which
were affected. Even today there is no way of distinguishing
male fetuses which are affected with some sex-linked dis-
orders-hemophilia, for example-from those which are not."
Many other inherited metabolic disorders and chromosomal
aberrations, however, are now directly detectable by amniocen-
6 Friedmann, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disease, 225 Sci. AM., Nov. 1971, at 37.
7 Menees, Miller, and Holly employed amniotic puncture as a diagnostic tech-
nique as early as 1930. Menees, Miller & Holly, Amniography: Preliminary Report,
24 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY & RADIUM THERAPY 363 (1930). Menees and his col-
leagues, however, injected radioactive strontium iodide into the amniotic sac to
highlight fetal X-rays; more than two decades passed before the amniotic fluid
itself was subjected to diagnostic analysis. Liley, The Technique and Complications
of Amniocentesis, 59 N.Z. MED. J. 581 (1960).
8 Riis & Fuchs, Antenatal Determination of Foetal Sex in Prevention of Hereditary
Diseases, 2 LANCET, July 23, 1960, at 180. See also Fuchs, Amniocentesis: Techniques
and Complications, in EARLY DIAGNOSIS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 11.
9See generally I. LERNER, HEREDITY, EVOLUTION AND SOCIETY 101-02 (1968);
A. WINCHESTER, GENETICS 122-29 (1958).
10 Riis & Fuchs, supra note 8.
"t Lapp6, Genetic Knowledge and the Concept of Health, 3 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Sept. 1973, at 3.
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tesis. 12 Consequently, genetic counselors can, in many instances,
predicate their advice to prospective parents not on "calculated
probability risks"' 3 but on practical certainty.
1. An Overview of Mendelian Genetics
At the present time, amniocentesis is performed discrimi-
nately on those pregnancies defined to be "at risk." An under-
standing of the concept of genetic risk requires a brief intro-
duction to Mendelian theory.
14
Each cell in the human body contains approximately 40,000
hereditary units called genes, each of which is housed in a thread-
like body called a chromosome. The normal human cell contains
forty-six chromosomes, grouped in twenty-three pairs-one
member of each pair being inherited from the mother and one
from the father. Every human being thus carries two genes for
any particular characteristic, such as eye color-one gene housed
in the chromosome transmitted by the father, and the other con-
tained in the homologous chromosome 5 inherited from the
mother. Generally, only one of the genes for any particular char-
acteristic will express itself; but either the expressed gene or its
unexpressed counterpart may be transmitted by the carrier to
his progeny.
The following example illustrates the manner in which ge-
netic traits are transmitted. Assume that a brown-eyed male has
descended from a family which has been strictly brown-eyed for
many generations; assume, further, that this is a "pure" brown-
eyed line, that all individuals in this line carry two genes for
brown. The term "homozygous" refers to such a condition. In
contrast, the term "heterozygous" refers to the state in which the
individual carries two different genes for any characteristic, for
example, one gene for brown eyes and one for blue. If a homo-
zygous brown-eyed male mates with a homozygous blue-eyed
female, each sperm will carry one gene for brown and each egg
will carry one gene for blue. All the offspring of this mating will
be heterozygous; in other words, they will carry one brown-eyed
12 Howell & Moore, Prenatal Diagnosis in the Prevention of Genetic Disease, 70
TEx. MED., No. 5, at 77 (1974).
13 Milunsky part 3, supra note 2, at 1503.
14 The following discussion was distilled from I. LERNER, supra note 9, at 98-
103, and A. WINCHESTER, supra note 9, at 66-76.
15 Only 22 of the 23 pairs of chromosomes contain homologous genetic ma-
terial. The twenty-third pair (the X and Y chromosomes), which determines fetal
sex, is, in general, non-homologous. See note 9 supra.
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gene and one blue-eyed gene. However, all of these children will
have brown eyes, since brown is dominant over blue.
If two of these heterozygous offspring subsequently mate
with each other, however, there are four possible combinations
of resultant offspring: brown-brown, brown-blue, blue-brown,
and blue-blue. Since the gene for blue eyes is recessive, only one
of these four combinations (blue-blue) will express itself in a
blue-eyed offspring. Two other combinations (brown-blue and
blue-brown) will result in brown-eyed offspring who carry a gene
for blue.
Thus if a particular genetic disease is known to be auto-
somal (non-sex-linked) recessive, 16 and both the mother and
the father are known to be heterozygous for the condition, the
probabilities are that one-fourth of their offspring will be af-
fected by the disease and an additional one-half will be carriers.
On the other hand, if both parents are heterozygous for an
autosomal dominant disease, 17 there is a three-fourths chance
that their offspring will be affected; if only one parent carries
the dominant gene, one-half of the children will probably be
affected.' 8
Not all hereditary diseases are amenable to Mendelian
analysis; some are caused by an abnormality of the chromo-
some rather than by a defect in a particular gene. 19
2. The Technique of Amniocentesis
Amniocentesis currently serves to identify genetic defects,
chromosomal anomalies, and the sex and blood type of the
fetus.20 About one-third of an ounce of amniotic fluid is re-
moved from the amniotic cavity; the usual procedure is to per-
forate the abdominal wall with a five-inch syringe, after the
fifteenth week of gestation. 2' Amniotic fluid aspirated during
16 E.g., Tay-Sachs disease, described in text accompanying notes 43-45 infra.
17 E.g., Huntington's Chorea; see text accompanying notes 57-58 infra.
11 Whittier, Heimler, & Korenyi, The Psychiatrist and Huntington's Disease (Chorea),
128 AM.J. PSYCHIAT. 1546, 1547 (1972).
19 E.g., trisomy 21 mongolism; see text accompanying notes 35-42 infra.
20 Carter, Practical Aspects of Early Diagnosis, in EARLY DIAGNOSIS SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 3, at 17; Nadler, Prenatal Detection of Genetic Defects, 74 J. PEDIAT.
132, 135 (1969). A tentative classification of pregnancies appropriate for amnio-
centesis has been compiled by a British psychiatrist. Compare Cowie, Amniocen-
tesis: A Means of Pre-natal Diagnosis of Conditions Associated With Severe Mental Sub-
normality, 118 BRIT. J. PSYCHIAT. 83, 84-85 (1971), with Littlefield, The Pregnancy
at Risk for a Genetic Disorder, 282 NEw ENG. J. MED. 627 (1970).
21 The sixteenth week of gestation is, in the opinion. of many physicians, the
most fruitful time for amniocentesis. Friedmann, supra note 6, at 36. As the
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amniocentesis is centrifuged in order to isolate the fluid's com-
ponent cells, which are compounded with calf serum and
grown in a culture medium for two to four weeks. 22 At that
time, the cells are responsive to two methods of examination-
chromosomal karyotyping and biochemical analysis.
Karyotyping is a technique whereby chromosomes are lo-
cated through microscopic examination, photographed, and
systematically ordered on the basis of physical characteristics.
23
Karyotype analysis can detect the absence or doubling of a par-
ticular chromosome, the deletion of a fragment of a chromo-
some, or the mutal exchange of fragments between two broken
chromosomes (reciprocal translocation)-all of which can result
in severe congenital disorders. 24 Karyotype analysis provides
for the evaluation of those pregnancies in which either parent
bears a known chromosomal aberration; it may, in addition,
help to ascertain prenatally the effect of allegedly mutagenic
agents, such as radioactive materials and LSD. 5
Although a chromosomal karyotype can be performed in
about fourteen days, 26 two factors hinder the potential utility
of this device. First, a relatively small number of genetic de-
fects are associated with visible chromosomal abnormalities;
and second, the great majority of these few defects arise from
an isolated mutation, rather than from a defect permanently
carried by the parent,27 so that a physician is not ordinarily
alerted to search for the defect.
pregnancy progresses, there is an increasing volume of amniotic fluid, which
facilitates the aspiration of a sample of the fluid. Yet the risk of fetal trauma is
minimized earlier in pregnancy, as the ratio of the fluid volume to fetal volume
tends to be greater at that time. Id.; Fuchs, supra note 8, at 13. Another restriction
is imposed by the several week time lag necessary for the completion of diagnostic
procedures and the legal time barriers beyond which an abortion may be proscribed
by the state. Heller, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Prevention of Birth Defects, 20 MD. ST.
MED. J., May 1971, at 60.
There is also a transvaginal technique which is performed at an earlier stage of
pregnancy, but this procedure is riskier and should be reserved for those preg-
nancies requiring early diagnosis. Fuchs, Amniocentesis and Abortion: Methods and
Risks, in 7 BIRTH DEFECTS: ORIGINAL ARTICLE SERIES, No. 5, at 18 (1971).
22 Nadler, supra note 20, at 135. See also Heller, supra note 21, at 60.
2' Howell & Moore, supra note 12, at 79-80.
24 Brody, Prenatal Diagnosis Is Reducing Risk of Birth Defects, N.Y. Times, June
3, 1971, at 53, col. 5.
25 Mintzer & Reisman, Prenatal Chromosome Studies: Diagnosis in Genetic Defects,
62 S. MED. J. 1220, 1221 (1969).
26 Therkelsen, Petersen, Steenstrup, Jonasson, Lindsten & Zech, Prenatal Diag-
nosis of Chromosome Abnormalities, 61 ACTA PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 397 (1972).
27 Dancis, The Prenatal Detection of Hereditary Defects, 24 OBST. & GYNEC. SURVEY
1351, 1352 (1969).
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The genetic constitution of a fetus can also be identified
by a biochemical analysis of the cells comprising the amniotic
fluid. 28 A close examination of these cells may sometimes de-
tect genetic defects manifested by abnormal enzyme activity.
29
Unfortunately, biochemical analysis ordinarily cannot be com-
pleted until approximately three or more weeks after amnio-
centesis has been performed.3 0 A lapse of such time might not
only induce psychological trauma in the prospective parents,
but, depending upon the week of gestation during which am-
niocentesis was performed, can also put the pregnant woman
into that part of the gestation period during which the state
may constitutionally prohibit abortion.31
3. The Domain of Amniocentesis
At present, certain chromosomal disorders and about fifty
inherited diseases associated with enzyme deficiencies are
amenable to prenatal diagnosis. 32 A description of several of
these disorders follows. 33
" Diagnostic Amniocentesis, 14 MED. LETTER ON DRUGS & THERAPEUTICS 53 (1972).
2 9 Id. Of course, inasmuch as only those disorders which are being looked for
can actually be discounted, the absence of abnormal activity in a particular enzyme
can never be conclusive of the fetus' normality. Uhlendorf, Use of Amniotic Fluid
and Reliability of Diagnostic Procedures, in EARLY DIAGNOSIS SYMPOSIUM, supra note
3, at 150-51.
Another drawback to this method is that a great deal of information regarding
the normal development, range of specific activity, and distribution of each enzyme
derived from the amniotic fluid should be known before attempting to utilize these
findings for interuterine diagnosis. Nadler, Prenatal Detection of Genetic Disorders,
3 ADVANCES IN HUMAN GENETICS 1, 14 (H. Harris & K. Hirschhorn eds. 1972).
30 The mean time is about 21 days, but the outer range is 40 days. Nadler,
supra note 29, at 10.
"The problem of growing adequate cell numbers in a sufficiently short time to
be of value is a greater deterrent for interuterine detection of biochemical dis-
orders than for chromosomal aberrations." Id. 14.
31 See notes 135-44 infra & accompanying text. Recent biomedical advances have
enabled scientists to perform analyses on connective tissue cells derived from fetal
skin. This new diagnostic procedure has facilitated the detection of an increasing
number of genetic disorders. Milunsky, Littlefield, Kanfer, Kolodny, Shih & Atkins,
Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis (pt. 1), 283 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1370 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Milunsky part 1].
32 Howell & Moore, supra note 12, at 77. This is about three to five percent of
all known birth defects. Heller, supra note 21, at 61.
"n Other genetic disorders currently receptive to amniocentesis include Hurler's
and Hunter's Syndrome, see Carter, Wan & Carpenter, Commonly Used Tests in the
Detection of Hurler's Syndrome, 73 J. PEDIAT. 217 (1968), and Fratantoni, Neufeld,
Uhlendorf & Jacobson, Intrauterine Diagnosis of the Hurler and Hunter Syndromes,
280 NEW ENG. J. MED. 686 (1969); Maple Syrup Urine Disease, see Dancis, Maple
Syrup Urine Disease, in ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS 123 (A. Dorfman ed. 1970), and L.
REISMAN & A. MATHENY, JR., GENETICS AND COUNSELING IN MEDICAL PRACTICE 162-63
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Down's Syndrome (mongolism) is the most common congeni-
tal anomaly, having an incidence of one in six hundred live
births.34 It is an untreatable condition caused by a chromo-
somal aberration rather than a defective gene.3 5 The disease
expresses itself in two forms: translocation, in which the fetus
inherits the disease from either parent whose chromosomal
composition contains a reciprocal translocation; 36 and trisomy
21, where the fetus carries three number 21 chromosomes
instead of the usual two.3 7 Translocation mongolism has a
tendency to recur in subsequent offspring because it is actually
inherited from a parent with a permanently aberrant chromo-
somal pattern.3 8 Trisomy 21 is the result of an isolated mu-
tation, 39 so there is no particular tendency for it to recur in
subsequent offspring; however, its incidence increases with
maternal age.40 It has been estimated that if all pregnancies
in women over thirty-five were subject to diagnostic amniocen-
tesis, and selective abortion were practiced, the rate of occur-
rence of the trisomy 21 form of the disease would be reduced
to half the present level.41 Likewise, if all reciprocal transloca-
tion carriers could be identified and subjected to both amnio-
centesis and selective abortion, the incidence of that form of
(1969); Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome, see Boyle, Raivio, Astrin, Schulman, Graf, Seegmiller
& Jacobsen, Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome: Preventive Control by Prenatal Diagnosis, 169 SCIENCE
688 (1970), and Friedmann, supra note 6, at 35; Wilson's Disease, see L. REISMAN &
A. MATHENY, supra, at 164-65; and Glycogen Storage Disease, see Howell, Kaback &
Brown, Type IV Glycogen Storage Disease: Branching Enzyme Deficiency in Skin Fibroblasts
and Possible Application to Antenatal Diagnosis, in ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS 161-63 (A.
Dorfman ed. 1970).
34 Garter, sup-a note 20, at 17. Half of the children with Down's syndrome have
congenital heart disease, which accounts for approximately 56% of the mortality
during the first year of life. L. REISMAN & A. MATHENY, supra note 33, at 71-73.
Ninety-five percent of all Down's syndrome children are severely mentally retarded.
Carter, supra note 20, at 17.
35 Friedmann, supra note 6, at 34.
36 A reciprocal translocation is the mutual exchange of fragments between two
broken chromosomes, one part of each uniting with part of the other. DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1631 (25th ed. 1973).
37 Friedmann, supra note 6, at 34-35.
38 If the father is the carrier, the risk is two percent for each subsequent preg-
nancy; if the mother is the carrier, the risk becomes thirty percent. O'Brien, How
We Detect Mental Retardation Before Birth, 99 MED. TIMES 103, 108 (1971).
39 I. LERNER, supra note 9, at 196.
40 Friedmann, supra note 6, at 35. Of the 3,500 mongoloid children born in the
United States each year, 50% are conceived by women over 35 years of age. O'Brien,
supra note 38, at 107. Women over 35 bear 13.5% of all pregnancies. Milunsky part
1, supra note 31, at 1376.
41 Friedmann, supra note 6, at 38; O'Brien, supra note 38, at 107.
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the disorder could be reduced. However, since many prospec-
tive parents in the latter category are otherwise quite healthy,
42
it is often impossible to identify them until they have already
borne one mongoloid child.
Tay-Sachs Disease is a devastating autosomal recessive con-
dition characterized by "blindness, severe mental retardation
and death, usually before three or four years of age. It is most
common in Jews of northern European origin (Ashkenazy
Jews). 43 The disease has an incidence in that population of
one in every 3,600 births, compared to one in every 360,000
births in the general population. 4 4 It is now possible to screen
large population groups rapidly for carrier states of the dis-
ease;45 screening programs coupled with amniocentesis and
selective abortion provide the potential means for a drastic re-
duction of the incidence of Tay-Sachs disease.
Galactosemia is an example of a genetic defect where am-
niocentesis can play a major role because the immediacy of
post-natal treatment can be crucial. This autosomal recessive
disorder involves the improper assimilation of galactose, which
is found in milk and milk products. It can be fatal if undiag-
nosed.46 Removal of galactose from the infant's diet is critical
to the management of the disease. Postnatal diagnosis is often
inadequate, however, since it is difficult to ascertain the cause
of the poisoning early enough to avert the brain damage and
other symptoms. 4 7 Amniocentetic diagnosis enables physi-
cians to place the infant on a low-galactose diet immediately
after birth.
48
Adrenogenital Syndrome is an autosomal recessive condition
which results in the appearance of abnormal genitalia, usually
in females. 49 If this disorder is not diagnosed prior to birth,
the female child may be registered as a male;50 but through
42 Lapp6, supra note 11, at 3.
'3 Friedmann, supra note 6, at 36.
14 Kaback & Zeiger, The John F. Kennedy Institute Tay-Sachs Program: Practical
and Ethical Issues in An Adult Genetic Screening Program, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 3, at 133.
45 Id.
46 Donnell & Kogut, Disorders of Carbohydrate Metabolism, in 5 CURRENT PEDIATRIC
THERAPY 359 (Gellis & Kagan ed. 1973).
47Id.
4 See L. REISMAN & A. MATHENY, supra note 33, at 205-06.
49 See id. 160-61.
50 Jeffcoate, Fliegner, Russell, Davis & Wade, Diagnosis of the Adrenogenital Syn-
drome Before Birth, 2 LANCET 553 (1965).
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surgical correction and medical treatment, a female with this
disorder can lead a normal and even reproductive life.5' The
adrenogenital syndrome is one of the very few detectable de-
fects which is even partially treatable prenatally; intrauterine
therapy will arrest the enlargement of the clitoris.
52
Fabty's Disease is a sex-linked genetic disorder in which a
specific enzyme deficiency damages the renal-cardiovascular
system and other bodily organs. 53 Some progress has been
made in developing enzyme replacement therapy for this
disease.
54
The two genetic disorders which occur with greatest fre-
quency in the United States are not prenatally detectable. They
are cystic fibrosis, an autosomal recessive condition affecting
one in every two thousand Caucasian infants,55 and sickle cell
anemia, an autosomal recessive disorder occurring with ex-
tremely high frequency in the black population. 56 Nor is the
most frequently occurring autosomal dominant condition,
Huntington's Chorea,57  presently amenable to prenatal
diagnosis.
58
51 New, Adrenogenital Syndrome, in ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS 153, 159 (A. Dorfman ed.
1970).
52 Id.160.
53 Desnick & Sweeley, Prenatal Detection of Fabry's Disease, in ANTENATAL DIAG-
NOSIS 185, 186 (A. Dorfman ed. 1970).
54 Brady, Hereditary Fat-Metabolism Diseases, 229 Sci. AM., Aug. 1973, at 97. M.
L. Moss and Warren W. Harris of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory have developed
a technique which reduces the time factor involved in the biochemical analysis of
Fabry's disease to 24 hours. Id. 95.
55 Brody, supra note 24, at 53, col. 6; Nadler & Gerbie, Present Status of Amnio-
centesis in Intrauterine Diagnosis of Genetic Defects, 38 OBsT. GYNEC. 789, 793 (1971).
Cystic fibrosis has been detected fortuitously, but the technique cannot be used
with reliability.
56 The disease occurs in that population with a frequency of one in every 400
births. Brody, supra note 24, at 53, col. 6. Cf. Littlefield, Milunsky & Jacoby,
Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis: Status and Problems, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note
3, at 48 (one in every 500). It is hoped that prenatal diagnosis of sickle cell anemia
will become practical within the next few years. Id.; Yuct, Dozy, Alter, Frigoletto
& Nathan, Detection of the Sickle Gene in the Human Fetus, 287 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 4
(1972).
57 The symptoms of this disease normally do not become manifest until well after
the end of the individual's reproductive period, so his fertility remains unimpaired.
Most cases are thus the result of parental transmission of the abnormal gene rather
than fresh mutation. Motulsky, Fraser & Felsenstein, Public Health and Long-Term Genetic
Implications of Intrauterine Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, in 7 BIRTH DEFECTS, No. 5, at
25 (1971).
58 "If a scheme of population screening and prospective diagnosis of Huntington's
chorea were to become practicable, the prevalence of this disease could thus be reduced
drastically to the very low levels maintained by mutation" by a relatively small number
of abortions, if selective abortion of affected fetuses were practiced. Id.
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B. The Medical Hazards and Risks of Prenatal Diagnosis
1. Problems of Technology
Any newly developed technology is likely to carry certain
risks, and amniocentesis is no exception. There have been re-
ports of incorrect analysis of chromosomal karyotype, enzyme
activity, and sex determination.59 For example, a phenotyp-
ically 60 normal woman with a reciprocal translocation had pre-
viously given birth to a son who shared the same reciprocal
translocation, and who suffered multiple congenital malforma-
tions. Amniocentesis performed during a subsequent preg-
nancy yielded a distinctly abnormal karyotype. Nonetheless,
termination of the pregnancy was not elected and a normal
child was born.6 In another instance, analysis of amniotic fluid
aspirated during amniocentesis revealed an abnormal 45, X
karyotype. 62 Abortion was performed and a culture of amni-
otic fluid extracted at that time revealed a normal male karyo-
type (46, XY),63 thereby discrediting the first diagnosis. More-
over, a recent study of attempts to employ amniocentesis to
ascertain the gender of the fetus revealed a thirteen percent
failure rate.64 Incorrect analysis of gender can have serious
ramifications in the management of those pregnancies in
which the mother is known to be a carrier of a sex-linked dis-
order.
Erroneous diagnoses have been attributed to a number
of factors. Among these are the aspiration of an inadequate
59 See, e.g., Nadler, Indications for Amniocentesis in the Early Prenatal Detection of
Genetic Disorders, in 7 BIRTH DEFECTS, No. 5, at 7 (1971):
In some cases, diagnosis appears to be accurate and reliable, while in others,
the methods of detection lack precision and therefore cannot be used for intra-
uterine diagnosis. Despite the advances in the past few years, a great deal more
experience is required before amniotic fluid, uncultured amniotic fluid cells and
cultivated amniotic fluid cells can be used as a routine method for the antenatal
detection of familial metabolic disorders.
60 A phenotype is "[t]he outward, visible expression of the hereditary constitu-
tion of an organism." DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1145 (24th ed.
1973).
61 Epstein, Schneider, Conte & Friedmann, Prenatal Detection of Genetic Disorder, 24
AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 214, 224 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Epstein].
62 A normal karyotype is either 46, XX (female) or 46, XY (male). See generally I.
LERNER, supra note 9, at 99-100.
63 Kardon, Chernay, Hsu, Martin & Hirschhorn, Pitfalls in Prenatal Diagnosis Resulting
from Chromosomal Mosaicism, 80 J. PEDIAT. 297 (1972).
64 Miller, An Overview of Problems Arising from Amniocentesis, in EARLY DIAGNOSIS
SYMPOsiuM, supra note 3, at 27 (citing Nelson & Emery, Amniotic Fluid Cells; Prenatal
Sex Prediction and Culture, I BRIT. MED. J. 523 (1970)).
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specimen of amniotic fluid,65 shipment difficulties resulting
in "artifactual inactivation of the enzyme,' 66 technical prob-
lems in the laboratory which affect the growth of cell culture,6"
and the contamination of amniotic fluid by maternal cells.6,
Furthermore, amniocentesis is, -at present, unable to de-
tect the presence of more than one fetus.69 Generally, only
one amniotic sac is sampled, and the cells thus grown are rep-
resentative of only one offspring, yielding no information
about the genetic or chromosomal composition of concurrent
fetuses.70 It has been suggested that ultrasonic techniques or
fetal cardiograms might be useful in identifying multiple fe-
tuses at an early stage of gestation.
7 '
Finally, there is the problem of heterozygosity. Geneti-
cists are currently equipped to distinguish a carrier from an
affected fetus in the Hurler's and Hunter's syndromes, galac-
tosemia, and Tay-Sachs disease.7 2 This ability, however, does
not extend to most other recessive genetic disorders,7 3 there-
by limiting the usefulness of amniocentesis.
2. Fetomaternal Risks
It is difficult to assess the degree to which amniocentesis
poses risks to either mother or fetus. The literature pertaining
to these risks primarily concerns risks presented during third
trimester amniocentesis; it is not known how high a correla-
tion exists between those risks and the risks of the procedure
when it is performed during the earlier stages of pregnancy.
7 4
" Kaback & O'Brien, Tay-Sachs: Prototype for Prevention of Genetic Disease, 8 HOSPITAL
PRACTICE, Mar. 1973, at 112.
66
Id.
67 See Brody, supra note 24, at 53, col. 5.
68 Macintyre, Chromosomal Problems of Intrauterine Diagnosis, in 7 BIRTH DEFECTS, No.
5, at 11 (1971).
69 Nadler & Gerbie, Role of Amniocentesis in the Intrauterine Detection of Genetic Dis-
orders, 282 NEw ENG. J. MED. 596, 598 (1970).
11 Nadler, supra note 59, at 6.
7 1
Id.
72 Hsia, Detection of Heterozygotes, in EARLY DIAGNOSIS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 118.
7s Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 2 LANCET 89, 90 (1969).
7' Ramsay, Screening: An Ethicist's View, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 154;
see generally Queenan, Kubarych, Shah & Holland, Role of Induced Abortion in Rhesus Im-
munization, 1 LANCET 815, 816 (1971). Of 410 pregnancies monitored by Dr. Henry L.
Nadler, no fetal or maternal complications related to the procedure arose. Brody, supra
note 24, at 41, col. 2. Likewise, of 162 cases monitored by Dr. Henry Nadler and Dr.
Albert Gerbie, transabdominal amniocentesis performed between 13 and 18 weeks gesta-
tion resulted in neither ntaternal nor fetal complications. Nadler & Gerbie, supra note
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There does seem to be some consensus among experts that
the risk of fetal or maternal injury is between one and two
percent, and that there thus must exist at least a two percent
risk that the fetus is genetically defective for amniocentesis to
be warranted.
7 5
Maternal injuries, although infrequent, include uterine
infection,76 inflammation of the amniotic membrane,77 perfo-
ration of the intestines,78 and placental hemorrhage79 -some of
which could result in maternal death.80 Moreover, the psycho-
logical repercussions of amniocentesis cannot be ignored. A
study of problems confronting parents who seek genetic coun-
seling and possible amniocentesis revealed that the lapse of
time between amniocentesis and completion of analyses re-
sulted, for some couples, in acute anxiety which tended to exac-
erbate other problems existing in their marriage.8' In many
instances, subsequent diagnosis confirmed the couple's mis-
givings, and caused suffering, feelings of guilt, and a sense of
failure.8 2 Of course, it can be argued that these problems would
exist, and indeed be intensified, if amniocentesis and abortion
were not available. In their absence, the waiting period for
anxiety-ridden parents would be the full nine months between
conception and birth, and a confirmation of the couple's fears
would result not only in parental suffering, but also in pain, suf-
fering, and often death on the part of the affected child.
69, at 596. See also Friedmann, supra note 6, at 37; Littlefield, Milunsky & Jacoby, supra
note 56, at 43. On the other hand, in a study of 410 amniocenteses conducted by Dr. Leo
J. Peddle, fetal bleeding into the mother emerged as a probably detrimental consequence,
affecting 11.2% of the Rh-negative women who were subjected to the procedure. Peddle,
Increase of Antibody Titer Following Amniocentesis, 100 AM. J. OBST. GE Nc. 567, 568-69
(1968).
75 See, e.g., Gerbie, Nadler & Gerbie, Amniocentesis in Genetic Counseling, 109 Am. J.
OBsT. GYNEC. 765, 766 (1971).
76 Fuchs, supra note 8, at 14.
77 Mandelbaum, Amniocentesis Technic, Applications and Complications, 69 MICH. MED.
209, 213 (1970).
78 Fuchs, supra note 8, at 14.
79 See Woo Wang, McCutcheon & Desforges, Fetomaternal Hemorrhagefrom Diagnostic
Transabdominal Amniocentesis, 97 AM. J. OBST. GYNEC. 1123 (1967); contra, Cassady,
Cailleteau, Lockard & Milstead, The Hazard of Fetal Maternal Transfusion after Transab-
dominal Amniocentesis, 99 Are. J. OBsT. GYNEc. 284 (1967); Jensen & Sorensen, The Risk
of Foetomaternal Bleeding in Connection with Amniocentesis, in 23 PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH
CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF BLOOD AND TRANSFUSION 937 (1964).
80 Burnett & Anderson, The Hazards of Amniocentesis, 58J. IOwA MED. SOC'Y 130, 133
(1968) (two instances of maternal mortality).
I" Fletcher, Parents in Genetic Counseling: The Moral Shape of Decision-Making, in
ETHICAL SYMPOSiUM, supra note 7, at 318.82
Id.
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The incidence of damage to the fetus from amniocentesis
appears to be greater than the frequency of complications to
the mother.8 3 Fetal death may result from infection of the
amniotic fluid,8 4 inflammation of the amniotic membrane,8 5
traumatic lesion of the cord or fetus, 6 or rupture of the pla-
centa.8 7 Fetal puncture, another complication of amniocentesis,
varies in severity from negligible skin lesions to damage to the
cerebrospinal system.88 Instances involving scarring of the
forehead,8 9 fetal emphysema (caused by inadvertent insertion
of the needle into the fetal thorax),90 and severe damage to the
eye 9' have been reported.
The possible long term consequences of amniocentesis are
still speculative. It has been hypothesized, for example, that
the removal of a large amount of amniotic fluid between the
fourteenth and sixteenth week of gestation could effect a loss of
intelligence. 92 The detection of developmental damage would
necessitate long term evaluation of those infants who have ex-
perienced amniocentesis. 93 Long range studies could likewise
determine the risk of the offspring's eventual deformity94 and
explore the long term effect of the procedure on the psycho-
logical well-being of the mother. 95
8" Hyman, Depp, Pakravan, Stinson & Allen, Pneumothorax Complicating Amniocentesis,
41 OBST. GYNEC. 43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hyman].
84 Bang & Northeved, A New Ultrasonic Method for Transabdominal Amniocentesis, 114
AM. J. OBST. GYNEC. 599 (1972).
85 Gerbie, Nadler & Gerbie, supra note 75, at 767.
86 Riis & Fuchs, supra note 8, at 182.
87 Fuchs, supra note 8, at 13; Woo Wang, McCutcheon & Desforges, supra note 79, at
1127. See also Stanchever & Cibils, Management of the Rh-Sensitized Patient, 100 AM. J.
OBST. GYNEC. 554, 562 (1968); Woo Wang, McCutcheon & Desforges, supra note 79, at
1123.
8 Bang & Northeved, supra note 84, at 599; Mandelbaum, supra note 77, at 213.
8, Epstein, supra note 61, at 217.
90 Hyman, supra note 83, at 43.
9' Letter to the Editor from Harold E. Cross & A.E. Maumenee, 287 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 993, 994 (1972).
92 See Nadler, Risks in Amniocentesis, in EARLY DIAGNOSIS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3,
at 130. See also Discussion of Symposium Papers, in 7 BIRTH DEFECTS, No. 5, at 33 (1971)
(statement by Miller) (concern that amniocentesis may result in mental retardation); dis-
cussion following Littlefield, Milunsky & Jacoby, supra note 56, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 3, at 54 (statement by Bearn).
9' See Friedmann, supra note 6, at 37.
94 Milunsky part 1, supra note 31, at 1371.
9 See generally discussion following Littlefield, Milunsky & Jacoby, supra note 56,
in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 52-53 (statements by Drs. Stetten, Lubs, and
Mellman).
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C. Societal Risks and Problems
1. The Risk of Gender Imbalance
Behavioral scientists who have investigated the matter are
virtually unanimous in concluding that there is a strong pref-
erence for male offspring in the United States. 96 In one recent
study, 1,800 nineteen-year-old males were surveyed regarding
their attitudes toward desired family size and gender pref-
erence.97 The young men expressed, in the mean, a desire for
1.65 boys and 1.24 girls, a male-female ratio of approximately
four to three. 98 Similarly, a survey of married women who had
already borne two children of the same gender revealed that
mothers of two girls were much more likely to desire a third
child than were mothers of two boys.99 Other studies have
yielded similar results. 00
These data raise a number of questions. Is sex determina-
tion alone a sufficient reason for performing amniocentesis? If
so, what will be the effect on the male-female ratio if parents
are allowed to selectively abort fetuses of the undesired gender?
On the other side, it may be argued that since many babies are
born in an attempt to produce a child of the desired sex, the
use of amniocentesis for gender selection would help slow the
population explosion.
2. Tampering with the Gene Pool
It has been estimated that if amniocentesis could be used to
identify those fetuses which were either affected by or carriers
of the genes for either of the two most common genetic dis-
orders in this country-cystic fibrosis and sickle cell anemia-
then the performance of fourteen million abortions over a span
of forty years "could eradicate these genes from the popula-
96 This male-oriented bias is not universal. In certain societies in New Guinea, for
example, male children are less valued than female children. M. MrAD, SEX AND TEM-
PERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES 171 (1963).
97 E. Weiss, Male Youths' Attitudes Toward Population Control, Family Planning and De-
sired Family Size (Paper presented at the 80th Annual Convention of the American Psy-
chological Association, Sept. 5, 1972) (on file with author).
98 More specifically, respondents who desired a two-child or four-child family showed
a marked preference for an equal number of boys and girls; but those desiring a one,
three, or five child family overwhelmingly preferred an extra male. Id.
99 L. BUMPASS & C. WESTOFF, THE LATER YEARS OF CHILD BEARING 93-94 (1970).
1' See, e.g., Freedman, Freedman & Whelpton, Size of Family and Preference for Chil-
dren of Each Sex, 66 AM. J. SocIoL. 141, 143 (1960).
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tion."'' 1 Some geneticists believe that this might not be an al-
together benign biological phenomenon, for a gene presently
deemed undesirable could in fact serve a vital function in the
protection of the body against another disorder. 10 2 For exam-
ple, there appears to be a correlation between the heterozygous
state of sickle cell anemia and resistance to falciparum malar-
ia. 10 3 Other instances of suspected interrelationships between
various (possibly) genetically controlled traits abound.'0 4 A
program of mass genetic manipulation, intended to eliminate
genes currently thought to be deleterious, could culminate in
"detrimental changes in the quality and the diversity of the
human gene pool.'
10 5
3. The Inability to Differentiate Between a
Carrier and an Affected Fetus
It is one thing to abort a fetus affected with a congenital
disorder, and quite another to abort one which is only a carrier.
Yet the fact that amniocentesis cannot currently be used to dif-
ferentiate between a carrier and an affected fetus for most
diseases 0 6 means that many carriers are in danger of being
aborted. The routine abortion of undifferentiated affected and
carrier fetuses, if pursued on a mass scale, would reduce the
future level of certain genetic diseases,' 0 7 but would also deny
life to a large number of unaffected offspring.
Moreover, if both parents are heterozygous for an auto-
somal recessive condition, the probabilities are that three-
fourths of their offspring will be either affected by, or carriers
of, the disorder.'08 This will "result in a 75% probability of
[elective] abortion with each pregnancy. There would then
101 Brody, Genetics Clinics Predict Defects, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § 1, at 76, col. 1.
102 See Sullivan, If We Master the Gene .... N.Y. Times, June 14, 1970, § 4, at 9,
col. 8.
103 See discussion following Hsia, Detection of Heterozygotes, in EARLY DIAGNOSIS SYMvO-
sIUm, supra note 3, at 125 (statement by Himsworth).
104 See, e.g., Lamborn, Social Control Through the Reconstitution of Man, 21 U. FLA. L.
REv. 452, 460 (1969) (citing A. ALLAND, JR., EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1967)).
See also Lapp6, supra note 11, at 2.
105 Friedmann, supra note 6, at 38; see also Dorfman, Medical Progress, Problems, and
Possibilities, in ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS 233 (A. Dorfman ed. 1972).
16 See notes 72-73 supra & accompanying text.
107 Friedmann, supra note 6, at 38, Heller, supra note 21, at 61.
108 See notes 14-18 supra & accompanying text.
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be a 24% risk that five consecutive pregnancies would be
aborted."' 0 9 Two experts maintain:
The risk of five successive abortions is the same as that
for having an affected offspring in the highest genetic
risk group, and the psychological trauma of five suc-
cessive abortions might even be greater than having a
child with one of these disorders. Accordingly, unless
differentiation between affected and heterozygous
individuals can be achieved with amniotic fluid cells,
it would be ill-advised to recommend amniocentesis
and intrauterine diagnostic studies for a disorder." 0
Personal views as to the immorality of abortion on the one
hand, or the avoidance of post-natal suffering on the other,
will, of course, affect this balance.
4. Who is Genetically Healthy?
Each human being is the carrier of a small number of per-
nicious or potentially lethal recessive genes."' Elimination of
these genes would require participation by the entire popula-
tion:
To reduce the frequency of a particular recessive gene
to near the level maintained by recurrent mutation,
most or all persons heterozygous for that gene would
have either to refrain from procreation entirely or to
monitor all their offspring in utero and abort not only
affected homozygote fetuses, but also the larger num-
ber of heterozygote carriers for the gene.'
1 2
Such a vision may be socially unrealistic, 1 3 but by rendering
this or less sweeping options technically feasible, amniocentesis
raises further questions. Who is genetically unhealthy? Is there
a danger of increasingly arbitrary standards being applied in
the assessment of genetic fitness?
1 4
109 Kaback, Discussion of Symposium Papers, in 7 BIRTH DEFECTS, No. 5, at 35 (1971);
see Ramsay, supra note 74, at 154.
I" Kaback & Leonard, Control Studies in the Antenatal Diagnosis of Human Genetic-
Metabolic Disorders, in EARLY DIAGNOSIS SymPosIum, supra note 3, at 170.
111 LappE, supra note 11, at 2. See also Stock, supra note 1, at 26.
112 Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, Ethical and Social Issues in
Screening for Genetic Diseases, 286 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1129, 1130 (1972).
"3 See I. LERNER, supra note 9, at 178-79 (the eugenic abortion of carriers on a
scale large enough to be significant would not lead to improvement but to termination
of mankind on earth).
114 Friedmann, supra note 6, at 41.
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The problem arises in at least three contexts. The first is
definitional: some congenital disorders seem to lie near the
borderline which separates "sickness" from "health." For ex-
ample,
What about the XXY pattern, Klinefelter's syndrome?
Here we have infertile men often carrying some
somatic stigmata. Statistically, such patients may be a
little more dull than the rest of the population, but
many individuals with Klinefelter's syndrome are not
"sick." The decision to label a given patient as "sick,"
therefore, is somewhat arbitrary.'
15
Second, there is the question of the causation of deviant
behavior which is statistically related to abnormal genetic or
chromosome composition. 1 6 For example, it has been sug-
gested that those men who have an additional Y chromosome
(47, XYY males) may be at greater risk of developing aggres-
sive antisocial behavior, committing criminal acts, and evincing
mental retardation than are normal (46, XY) males. 1 7 But
there is a lack of conclusive evidence that the criminal behavior
derives from the additional chromosome rather than from
some other factor;" 8 and it appears that very few 47, XYY
males are either retarded or criminal. 119 These facts are, in
themselves, reasons not only for refraining from the routine
abortion of all such karyotypically abnormal individuals, but
also for forbearing from prenatal screening for this "defect."
If an amniocentesis reveals an XYY karyotype, and the parents
choose not to terminate the pregnancy, the information may
cause the parents to be extremely anxiety-ridden and may ef-
fect either extra-punitive or overly-protective parental attitudes
and behavior toward the child. Such a result may outweigh the
potential gains to be derived from the use of amniocentesis for
prenatal diagnosis of chromosomal disorders which are sta-
tistically, but not necessarily causally, related to aberrational
behavior.
115 Motulsky, The Significance of Genetic Disease, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note
3, at 59.
116 See Friedmann, supra note 6, at 41-42.
I" See generally Miller, supra note 64, at 26.
118 Friedmann, supra note 6, at 41.
119 See Jacobs, Price, Richmond & Ratcliffe, Chromosome Surveys in Penal Institutions
and Approved Schools, 8 J. MED. GENETICS 49, 52-53 (1971).
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Finally, the possible development of post-natal treatment
for genetic disorders120 is an argument against the routine
abortion even of afflicted fetuses.1
21
II. GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF AMNIOCENTESIS
As amniocentesis becomes more prevalent, it is likely that
governments will begin to regulate the conditions under which
the procedure may, perhaps must, be performed. 22 Any po-
tential government program would probably fall into one of
three categories: a completely voluntary program; a statute
mandating amniocentesis for some or all pregnant women but
providing for voluntary selective abortion of defective progeny;
or legislation mandating amniocentesis for some or all preg-
nant women, and further compelling abortion of fetuses found
to be "defective."'
' 23
A. A Completely Voluntary Program
A completely voluntary program combined with extensive
public education might be effective in reducing the incidence
of those genetic diseases which are prenatally detectable. Given
the incidence of fetal and maternal injury, 124 amniocentesis
should probably not be made accessible to all pregnant women,
but simply to those who are at risk for a particular disorder.
2 5
1
2 0 See note 54 supra & accompanying text.
121 Consider the analogy to diabetes prior to the development of insulin. A.
WINCHESTER, supra note 9, at 300, 384.
122 This has been the case with postnatal diagnosis of hereditary disorders. See
Swazey, Phenylketonuria: A Case Study in Biomedical Legislation, 48 J. URa. L. 883 (1971).
123 Similar questions may arise if health insurance policies are offered providing care
contingent on amniocentesis and selective abortion:
The economic cost of genetic disease is indeed large and at least a portion of that
cost is borne by the stockholders of, and premium payers to, health insurance
companies whose myriad plans cover vast numbers of employed persons and
their families. It takes little prescience to be certain that in the near future
some insurance carrier will offer only a special form of maternity coverage. The
insured and spouse under the plan will have to agree, as a condition of coverage,
to submit (at the expense of the company) to the broadest form of genetic screen-
ing available at the time-sickle cell, cystic fibrosis, perhaps, all women over
35 for mongolism. If the pregnancy is at risk, the mother will be required to
undergo amniocentesis (again, at the expense of the company), and if the fetus
is affected, it will be aborted-at the expense of the company. But if such a fetus
is carried to term, the delivery and after-care will not be at the expense of the
company. Will we lawyers and counselors permit health insurance companies to
offer such coverage?
Singer, Impact of the Law on Genetic Counseling, in 9 BIRTH DEFECTs, No. 4, at 34, 38 (1973).
1
24 See notes 74-95 supra & accompanying text.
125 See note 20 supra.
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1. Existing Genetic Screening Programs
Ample prototypes already exist for a governmentally
funded voluntary program for prenatal diagnosis. For exam-
ple, at the federal level, the National Sickle Cell Anemia Con-
trol Act 126 provides that the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare may make grants and contracts for the establish-
ment and operation of sickle cell anemia screening and coun-
seling programs. 27 Participation of individuals in the program
is completely voluntary,12 8 and grant applicants must provide
for the confidentiality of medical records and test results.'
29
At the local level, the Baltimore-Washington, D.C. area
Tay-Sachs Screening Program, funded in part by the Maryland
State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, serves to
illustrate that a governmentally sponsored voluntary genetic
screening program can be met with widespread participation
by large but identifiable population groups.130 During the first
five months of that program, approximately eight thousand in-
dividuals of Ashkenazi Jewish origin were screened for carrier
states of Tay-Sachs disease. All couples found to be at risk for
bearing afflicted children were informed of the availability of
amniocentesis for the purpose of monitoring present or future
pregnancies.' 31
The relative ease with which this program was imple-
mented may be due to circumstances which would not be pres-
ent in a program of voluntary amniocentesis for all high risk
pregnant women. Under the Tay-Sachs program, there was a
126 42 U.S.C. § 300b (Supp. II, 1972).
127 Id. § 300b(a)(1). See Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal
and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 696, 703 (1973).
128 42 U.S.C. § 300b-2 (Supp. II, 1972). A number of states, however, have statutes
which require certain categories of persons to undergo sickle cell anemia testing. New
York, for example, makes a sickle cell test mandatory for "each applicant for a marriage
license who is not of the Caucasian, Indian or Oriental race," N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 13-aa
(McKinney Supp. 1974), and further requires a one-time screening for all pupils between
the ages of four and nine in "a city school district contained within a city." N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 904 (McKinney Supp. 1974). Persons who refuse to take either test on religious
grounds are exempted. Illinois requires school children to undergo sickle cell testing
whenever an examining physician determines that the test is necessary, but exempts pupils
who object "on constitutional grounds." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 27-28 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1974). See Waltz and Thigpen, supra note 127, at 704-07. See also GA. CODE ANN.
§ 88-1201 (Supp. 1972).
129 42 U.S.C. § 300b-3(a)(2) (Supp. II, 1972).
130 See Kaback & Zeiger, supra note 44, at 132-34.
131 None of the ten couples found to be at risk for bearing children with Tay-Sachs
disease had a previous hi~tory of the disease in their immediate families. Id. 144.
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connecting link between those running the program and those
who were potential participants. Because screening was to be
limited to persons of Ashkenazi Jewish origin, the organized
Jewish community, particularly the rabbinate, served not only
to educate potential participants as to the existence of the pro-
gram but also to recommend participation. 132 Obviously, a
voluntary program of amniocentesis for certain high risk
groups (for example, pregnant women over the age of thirty-
five) would have neither the clergy nor -a well defined cohesive
community to fulfill the related functions of education and per-
suasion. Thus, those roles would probably have to be assigned
to the medical profession. All candidates for amniocentesis are
pregnant, and thus are usually already under the care of a
physician. If the medical profession were properly educated, 133
there would be no insurmountable obstacle to widespread par-
ticipation.
The drafters of any amniocentesis statute, however, will
have to face at least two legal issues: the problem of elective
therapeutic abortion during the third trimester of pregnancy,
and the conflict between the physician's duty to maintain pri-
vacy and his duty of disclosure.'
34
2. Elective Therapeutic Abortion During the
Third Trimester of Pregnancy
Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28
weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.
... For the stage subsequent to viability, the State
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
132 Kaback & Zeiger, supra note 44, at 139.
133 Discussion following Hall, The Concerns of Doctors and Patients (Discussion), in
ETHICAL SYMPOSiUM, supra note 3, at 34-35 (statement by Carter):
The National Health Service in England has dealt with this in the following way.
The Central Advisory Council to the Ministry of Health has sent to every doctor
in the United Kingdom a small pamphlet setting out very simply the principles
of genetics, what genetic counseling can do, and which are appropriate families,
in a broad way, to refer to a clinic. Listed at the back are individual clinics
now established.
There is at least one clinic in each of the hospital administrative regions,
so every general practitioner knows who is the appropriate genetic counselor
to whom he can refer parents with a genetic problem.
134 See notes 271-73 infra.
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medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.
Roe v. Wade
1 35
Any amniocentesis proposal will have to face the difficult
issue of third trimester abortions of "defective" fetuses, for the
results of the procedure will often not be available prior to that
time. Because many physicians believe that the sixteenth week
of gestation is the most fruitful time for amniocentesis, 136 and
since biochemical analysis of the amniotic fluid requires an
additional three (and sometimes four or five) weeks for com-
pletion,137 the results of the test will usually not be known until
at least the nineteenth or twentieth week of gestation. Should
the procedure have to be repeated, or if there is delay for any
other reason, a positive diagnosis of genetic disorder might not
be made until subsequent to the twenty-fourth week of gesta-
tion. The question which then emerges is whether the state can
restrict the mother's 138 right to opt for abortion at so late a stage
in pregnancy. The issue arises because of language in Roe v.
Wade to the effect that a state may not proscribe post-viability
abortion if termination of the pregnancy is necessary to pre-
serve "the life or health of the mother.' 3 9 The ambiguity in-
heres in the term "health," which arguably embraces mental
health. 140 Under that interpretation, a mother might qualify for
a post-viability abortion free from state interference if she were
extremely distressed by a belated diagnosis of a genetic dis-
ease.
1 4 1
135 410 U.S. 113, 160, 164-65 (1973).
136 See note 21 supra.
137 See note 30 supra & accompanying text.
138 The question whether the father has the right to participate in the abortion de-
cision is discussed in Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litiga-
tion and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 242-45 (1974).
139 410 U.S. at 164-65.
141 See United States v. Viutch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (general usage and modern
understanding of the word "health" includes psychological as well as physical well-being).
141 One recent commentator has stated categorically that "[t]he Supreme Court held
that even during the period of viability abortions to preserve the life or health-physical
or mental-of the mother cannot be proscribed." Note, supra note 138, at 241. Roe is
quoted in support: "Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon a woman a dis-
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health
may be taxed by child care ...." 410 U.S. at 153. It appears, however, that the Supreme
Court's concern for maternal mental health was limited to points in gestation prior to
the viability of the fetus. After discussing the right of the mother to be free from psycho-
logical distress, the Court continued:
[A] state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in main-
taining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in preg-
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But it is possible that the Roe Court intended to give states
wide latitude to proscribe post-viability abortions except when
maternal life or physical health is in jeopardy. A few states have
expressly interpreted Roe in exactly this manner. 142 Other
states, less stringent in their discretionary regulation of post-
viability abortions, have specifically provided that preservation
of mental as well as physical health is a legitimate justification
for a third trimester abortion.143 Either of these options seems
to be permitted by Roe, leaving only the question which alter-
native is more desirable. In the case of an abortion statute
standing alone, the answer depends on one's ethical, societal,
and theological viewpoint. However, if the abortion law is
coupled with an amniocentesis provision, then the choice is
clearer-the state should permit third trimester abortions of
fetuses which have been prenatally diagnosed as "defective."
Otherwise the state will be in the position of offering (or forc-
ing) prenatal diagnosis, but prohibiting some women from
acting fully upon the information obtained. Thus, any jurisdic-
tion which establishes an amniocentesis program should include
in its abortion law a provision such as the following:
Between the - and - weeks of pregnancy
a licensed physician is justified in performing an abor-
tion if prenatal diagnosis has revealed that there is a
substantial likelihood that the child would be born
with grave physical or mental defect.'
44
3. The Physician's Duty to Maintain Privacy
Versus His Duty of Disclosure
The genetic counselor will ultimately be presented with a
conflict between the duty to protect the patient's privacy and
the duty to inform the patient's relatives that they, too, are at
risk of bearing a child similarly afflicted.' 45 For example, sup-
nancy these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regula-
tion of the factors that govern the abortion decision.
Id. at154.
"42 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-608(3) (Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-108
(Supp. 1974).
113 See e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-14(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
144 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
'"Hall, The Concerns of Doctors and Patients, in ETHICAL SymposiuM, supra note 3,
at 23, 30; Lubs, Privacy and Genetic Information, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at
267-68; Motulsky, The Significance of Genetic Disease, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note
3, at 59, 64.
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pose that an amniocentesis performed on patient A reveals that
the fetus is affected with translocation mongolism. A subse-
quent chromosomal study of A and her husband shows that A
is the carrier of the disease. Thus, the chances are relatively
high that A's sister, B (a woman of child-bearing age), and A's
first cousin, C (a woman who is two months pregnant), are also
carriers of this permanently aberrant chromosome pattern. 146
A, stating that her sister and cousin are terrible gossips, requests
that the information not be disclosed to them. Since A plans to
have her mongoloid baby aborted, B and C need never know.
Do the Hippocratic Oath 147 and the ethics of the doctor's pro-
fession 48 demand that he refrain from revealing the condition
of A and her unborn child? Or do the very real medical needs
of B and C (and the needs of society in general) transcend A's
right to confidentiality?
Any governmentally sponsored amniocentesis program,
even a completely voluntary one, must face this problem. Since
the conflict between the duty to maintain privacy and the duty
to disclose can be anticipated in advance, it should be resolved
statutorily. Otherwise physicians will be forced to undergo mal-
practice suits for the purpose of retrospectively determining
their obligations. A legislature confronted with the problem
would have three alternatives. First, it could provide, as does
the National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, 149 for the confi-
dentiality of medical records and test results. In a completely
voluntary amniocentesis program, such a provision might have
the advantage of encouraging the participation of some who
would otherwise be reluctant to subject themselves to the proce-
dure. The disadvantages of such a provision are obvious: our
hypothetical B or C might bear an affected child before realizing
that she, too, was a candidate for amniocentesis.
A second statutory alternative would be to impose a duty
146 Motulsky, supra note 145, at 64.
147 The Hippocratic Oath provides, inter alia: "Whatever, in connection with my pro-
fessional practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which
ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that all such should be
kept secret." B. GORDON, MEDICINE THROUGHOUT ANTIQUITY 517 (1949).
14 E.g., Principles of Medical Ethics § 9, in AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, OPINIONS AND
REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL VII (197 1):
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of
medical attendance, or the deficiences he may observe in the character of
patients, unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in
order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.
149 42 U.S.C. § 300b (Supp. II, 1972); see notes 126-29 supra & accompanying text.
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on the physician to divulge the information to those family
members who are at risk but to no one else. This approach
seems undesirable; it would serve neither to protect privacy
fully (there is no guarantee that the information would stay
within family circles) nor fully to promote the public health
functions of disclosure. If B and C must be notified, what about
D, A's distant cousin who lives three thousand miles away, and
who also bears a risk, albeit a lesser one, of being a carrier of the
disorder? What about other relatives whose existences are un-
known to the doctor and not revealed by the patient?
A third possibility, discussed in the following section, is to
devise a state or federal system for reporting genetic disease.
4. A State or National Registry System for Reporting
Genetic Disease
It has been argued that any voluntary amniocentesis or
genetic counseling program should be accompanied by a regis-
try system for reporting genetic disease. 150 British physician
Cedric 0. Carter has concluded that
there is a need for a registry, not necessarily to trace
and counsel these other people at risk, but to tell their
doctors. Then the decision as to what should be done
rests, as it should, with the family doctor. He may de-
cide to keep quiet about it or may decide that he should
refer the person involved for counseling.
Having a registry system also has the advantage
that one can contact people at the age when they need
genetic counseling. One will know automatically that
there are 30 individuals in the country who are 18 or
19 years old with 50 percent risk of Huntington's
chorea.
151
In the United States, there are already at least two state-
wide private genetic registries which depend on voluntary par-
ticipation. One physician in Oregon and another in Colorado
are currently computerizing the histories of all families in those
states who have been afflicted with genetic disorders.
52
150 Discussion following Motulsky, The Significance of Genetic Disease, in ETHICAL
SYmaPosium, supra note 3, at 66-67 (statement by Carter); Lubs, supra note 145, at
267, 273.
151 Carter, supra note 150, at 66-67.
1.2 Lubs, supra note 145, at 273.
New York's Genetic Alert Program, an experiment with a public registry, was estab-
lished in part to determine the possibility of accumulating "fundamental, useful data
1974)
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A governmentally established and controlled reporting
and registry system would undoubtedly be more complete, and
hence more effective, than the current private systems. There
is no doubt, however, that such a system would make inroads on
the traditional concept of doctor-patient confidentiality. A
recent Second Circuit opinion indicates that a governmental
reporting system which impinges on that confidential rela-
tionship may be unconstitutional. In Roe v. Ingraham,15 3 sev-
eral doctors and patients challenged a New York statute which
required physicians and pharmacists to file with state officials
copies of prescriptions (which contained, among other infor-
mation, the name, address, and age of the patient) for addictive
drugs. This information was to be fed to a computer which
would then determine which patients used addictive drugs
and which physicians prescribed them. The state argued that
the filing requirement was necessary in order for the Depart-
ment of Health to be able to detect a number of serious abuses,
such as the same patient going from doctor to doctor and there-
by obtaining great quantities of addictive drugs, which could
either be used by the patient or sold illicitly. The Second Circuit
characterized the state's contentions as "powerful" but noted:
"Should the constitutionally protected zone of privacy be ex-
tended . . . the individual's interest in keeping to himself the
existence of his physical ailments and his doctor's prescriptions
for them would lie rather close in the continuum." 154 The court
thus reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint
and remanded the action so that the trial court could balance
the state's need for a central information system against the
patient's right to confidentiality and privacy, 5 5 and explore
fully the manner in which the confidentiality of identifying
data was being preserved.
about the abnormalities of the human gene pool." Swazey, supra note 122, at 922. Be-
tween 1965 and 1967, the program compiled genetic information and histories of ap-
proximately 4,000 children. The data accumulated were placed not only in the child's
medical records but also on punched computer cards for later study. It was hoped that
this program would serve as a model for a national Genetic Alert, but that goal has
not been realized. Id.
153 480 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1973).
154 Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted).
115 See Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 714, 341
N.Y.S.2d 242 (1973), rev'g 70 Misc. 2d 1093, 335 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1972), which
involved a New York ordinance that required, after abortion, the filing of a fetal death
certificate including the mother's name and address. The trial court held that the death
certificate procedure violated the mother's right of privacy. The Appellate Division re-
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Roe v. Ingraham would seem to cast doubt on the validity of
a centralized amniocentesis registry. However, the govern-
mental interest in obtaining complete genetic data appears
stronger than the governmental interest at issue in Ingraham.
The absence of a centralized drug prescription registry nor-
mally would damage the health and safety only of "consensual"
victims-patients who obtained large quantities of addictive
drugs and persons who made illicit purchases from those pa-
tients. The purpose of an amniocentesis registry, however,
would be to protect those who might not realize that they are at
risk for a particular disorder. In this respect an amniocentesis
reporting system would be very similar to the many state stat-
utes which require physicians to disclose cases of communicable
diseases to public health officials.' 56 Genetic disorders are not
communicable, but they are transmissible, and their transmis-
sion might be greatly curtailed by a statewide, or perhaps even
nationwide, reporting system. A centralized amniocentesis
registry would embody the same principle which underlies not
only communicable disease reporting statutes, but also the
American Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics:
the recognition that the physician-patient privilege must some-
times be modified "in order to protect the welfare of the indi-
vidual or of the community.'
u57
Even the Second Circuit in Ingraham recognized that one
way of reconciling the public health needs of the community
with the privacy needs of the individual is for the government
to ensure that the reported data will remain as confidential as
versed and remanded "in fairness to all parties and in light of judicial decisions hand-
ed down since the determination herein, most notably Roe v. Wade." 41 App. Div. 2d
at 714, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 243. Upon reconsideration, the lower court examined the possible
state interests involved and found that those interests did not justify infringement of
the rights guaranteed by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Schulman v. New York City
Health & Hosp. Corp., 75 Misc. 2d 150, 346 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1973). Cf. Doe v.
Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
1
5 6 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-89 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:39 (1965);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 11, § 111 (1967); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 329.152 (1967); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:4-15 (1964); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2101 (McKinney 1971); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 143.04 (1974).
Similarly, several states require physicians to report cases of child abuse to state
officials, and specifically provide that the physician-patient privilege is not applicable
to such situations. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.571, 722.573 (1968); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2103, 2107 (Supp.
1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (Supp. 1974). See Note, Recent Legislation: An Exception
to Use of the Physician-Patient Privilege in Child Abuse Cases, 42 U. DEr. L.J. 88 (1964).
57 See note 148 supra.
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possible. If this is done, a disclosure statute might withstand
constitutional challenge.
While the Constitution does not condemn a state to
using ineffective means in dealing with a problem as
serious as the use of the opiates and stimulants ... , it
may well condition use of a more effective means
which involves a danger to constitutionally-protected
privacy on the taking of all reasonable precautions to
limit the risk . . . . If it were clear that the State had
taken or proposed to take effective steps, by regulation
or otherwise, to limit access to the patients' names on
the prescription forms as rigidly as is consistent with
accomplishment of the asserted statutory purpose, the
grounds for constitutional attack might disappear.'
58
Information submitted to an amniocentesis registry need not be
generally available, and any provision for an amniocentesis
reporting system should specifically require the confidentiality
of all data obtained.
Requirements for disclosure should vary according to dis-
ease type. For example, if amniocentesis reveals a fetus affected
by an autosomal recessive disorder, then both parents must be
carriers of the gene, and consequently both maternal and pa-
ternal relatives should be notified. 159 If amniocentesis reveals a
sex-linked disorder, however, normally only maternal female
relatives need be notified. 60 In each case, the goal would be
notification sufficiently broad to encompass all relatives at risk,
but no broader.
B. Mandatory Amniocentesis Followed by Voluntary
Selective Abortion of Defective Fetuses
A slightly more stringent government program would in-
volve mandatory amniocentesis of all women who are at risk
for carrying fetuses with genetic defects. These are women who
are known to be carriers of a genetic disease or who have some
other characteristic, such as being over thirty-five years old,
that makes the appearance of genetic defects in their progeny
substantially more likely than in the population as a whole.' 6'
In this program, government intervention would be limited to
158 480 F.2d at 109.
"' See notes 14-19 supra & accompanying text.
160 See note 9 supra & accompanying text.
161 See Cowie, suprq note 20.
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compelling amniocentesis of pregnant women in the relevant
population; the decision whether to abort a genetically defec-
tive fetus would be left entirely to the parents.
In developing the program, the government would be con-
cerned with two specific goals. The first one is easing the pres-
sure on the fisc caused by the need to place many genetically
defective children in public institutions. The second is the
more generalized state interest in alleviating the pain and suf-
fering that inevitably accompany the birth of a defective child.
Both of these goals are met only indirectly by the proposed
program; without the requirement that defective fetuses be
aborted, the state cannot ensure that either one will be met.
The state's interest is not totally de minimis, however; it is most
likely that at least some women who choose abortion would not
have learned of their fetus' defects, and would not have aborted
it, without the mandatory amniocentesis program. The state's
goals will thus be furthered by the program, but admittedly not
as substantially as they would be if the program included man-
datory abortion in appropriate cases as well. Perhaps the pro-
gram can be viewed as a first step toward that end.
Several ethical objections to the program can be raised.
For example, there may be no justification for compelling
amniocentesis of a woman who has stated in advance that she
will not have an abortion regardless of the test result. 162 Given
the risks of injury and invasion of privacy, it might be unethical
to subject such a patient to the test. 163 On the other hand, at
least one gynecologist 164 believes that amniocentesis should be
performed on a voluntary basis even if the parents are not will-
ing to terminate the pregnancy in the event of a positive diag-
nosis. He reasons that if the fetus is found to be normal, the
slight risk involved in the technique is outweighed by the peace
of mind gained by the patient for the several remaining months
of gestation. Moreover, if the fetus is found to be defective, the
162 It is clear that some parents will not opt for abortion even after an affected child
.is diagnosed. For example, in one study 119 amniocenteses were performed for 21 dif-
ferent inherited disorders. Thirty-three affected fetuses were diagnosed, but only 27 sets
of parents opted for abortion. Littlefield, Milunsky & Jacoby, supra note 56, at 43, 45.
These authors state, "[M]any centers feel that amniocentesis should not be done unless
parents are prepared to take appropriate action. Other geneticists feel differently on
this point, however." Id. 44-45.
163 Waltz & Thigpen, supa note 127, at 739.
164 Discussion following Littlefield, Milunsky & Jacoby, Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis:
Status and Problems, in ETHICAL SYMNPosiuM, supra note 3, at 52 (statement by Valenti).
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parents might, and sometimes do, change their minds and opt
for abortion.1 65 Finally, and most importantly, if disorders be-
come amenable to prenatal treatment, abortion will not be the
only "cure" for genetic disease.
These ethical arguments are not the only ones that can be
marshalled for or against a mandatory amniocentesis program.
A statute which compels high risk women to submit to amnio-
centesis also gives rise to constitutional questions.
1 66
1. Compulsory Amniocentesis and the Free Exercise
of Religion
Even without requiring abortion of defective progeny, a
statute mandating amniocentesis might impinge on the free
exercise of religion in two respects. First, the procedure is a
medical one, and thus ipso facto would violate the tenets of
several religious faiths. Second, it is arguable that mandatory
amniocentesis is simply the first step in a program of negative
eugenics 167 which contemplates (even though it does not re-
165 Id.
166 In addition to the first and fourth amendment issues analyzed in the text accom-
panying notes 167-200 infra, a mandatory amniocentesis program could conceivably run
afoul of the equal protection clause. Statutory categorizations which are based on sus-
pect classifications must be justified by the showing of a compelling state interest. See,
e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967). A compulsory amniocentesis statute would, of necessity, classify pregnant wom-
en into two categories-those who are at risk for a disorder and are therefore required
to submit, and those who are not known to be at risk and are not obligated to submit. It
could be argued that such a classification is "suspect" in that, just like classifications
based on race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), alienage, Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), or national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46
(1948), it singles out persons solely on the basis of their heritage rather than on the
basis of something over which they have control, cf. Vukowich, The Dawning of a Brave
New World-Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 208-09. A
genetic categorization would appear to be at least rationally related to a state interest;
but would the state interest be compelling? A mandatory amniocentesis statute, in and
of itself, cannot ensure that the defective fetus will not be born. It can serve to identify
at risk fetuses and to exert pressure on parents to abort them, as well as to warn unknow-
ing relatives of their risk. But it is doubtful that these interests would be deemed compel-
ling, because a voluntary program might be almost as effective in achieving the same pur-
pose. See notes 130-33 supra & accompanying text. If a genetic classification is suspect,
then, the purposes of identifying and encouraging the abortion of at risk fetuses and the
notification of relatives of their potential risk would not provide a compelling justifica-
tion for compulsory amniocentesis. But if a genetic classification is not suspect, these
interests seem to be rational, and thus would be sufficient to uphold a compulsory
amniocentesis statute.
"6' See generally notes 223-35 infra & accompanying text.
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quire) abortion of defective fetuses.' 68 To that extent, forced
participation in such a program might violate the principles of
any religion which believes that life begins at conception 169 and
that the sanctity of such life is an absolute.
When confronted with the issue of when a state can compel
conduct contrary to religious beliefs and principles, the Su-
preme Court has said that "only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion." 70 To protect free
exercise interests, the Court has applied the "compelling state
interest" test to statutory restrictions on those interests. 17 ' But
the interest in protecting children from serious danger or dis-
ease has been held sufficient to overcome a free exercise attack.
In Prince v. Massachusetts,'7 2 the Supreme Court sustained the
validity of a child labor law which prohibited minors from sell-
ing materials in public places and made it unlawful to furnish
any article to a minor with knowledge that the child intended
to sell it in violation of the law. An adult Jehovah's Witness chal-
lenged the statute on the ground that it impinged on the exer-
cise of religious beliefs by prohibiting her from furnishing her
168 To the extent that amniocentesis is used in conjunction with intrauterine and
immediate post-natal therapy rather than with subsequent abortion, however, the pro-
cess would seem entirely consistent with respect for the value of fetal life.
169 This is the official belief of the Catholic Church. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-
61 & n.61 (1973) (citing D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE, AND MORALITY 409-47
(1970), and Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION
1, 3-7 (J. Noonan ed. 1970)).
170 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). The Court held that Wisconsin
could not compel certain Amish parents to send their children to a formal high school
until age sixteen in violation of their religious beliefs. The children, the Court noted,
were formally educated through the eighth grade, and there was no showing of "any
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order,
or welfare" attributable to the children's lack of formal secondary schooling. Id. at 230.
171 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963):
[T]he Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to govern-
mental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or prin-
ciples, for "even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions,
[it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 603. The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some sub-
stantial threat to public safety, peace or order.... [A]ny incidental burden on
the free exercise of appellants religion may be justified by a "compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate ...." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438.
172 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598
(1968) (per curiam), aff'g 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), the Supreme Court, with
only a citation to Prince, affirmed a decision upholding the Washington state scheme for
authorizing necessary blood transfusions for children over parents' objections on relig-
ious grounds.
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minor ward with religious materials to sell on the streets. In
concluding that religious freedoms must, in that situation, be
subordinated to the state's interest in protecting minor chil-
dren, the Court stated:
The right to practice religion does not include liberty
to expose the community or the child to communicable
disease or the latter to ill health or death....
Parents may be free to become martyrs them-
selves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children be-
fore they have reached the age of full and legal dis-
cretion when they can make that choice for them-
selves.1
7 3
This language has been relied upon by several state courts
in upholding the validity of statutes mandating the vaccination
of school children 7 4 and requiring blood transfusions17  and
operations 7 6 for children against challenges by parents on
religious grounds. Obviously, however, such requirements are
very different from mandatory amniocentesis. The former
are designed to protect children and others from the dangers
of illness and communicable disease, and hence further a com-
pelling interest of the state.
In contrast, subjecting religious objectors to a mandatory
amniocentesis program without a mandatory abortion program
would not further any compelling interest of the state. Those
who are opposed to prenatal diagnosis on religious grounds
would be very unlikely candidates for voluntary selective abor-
tion; subjecting them to compulsory amniocentesis would thus
173 321 U.S. at 166-67, 170.
174 See, e.g., Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964) and cases cited there-
in. The Supreme Court case which sustained the validity of compulsory vaccination,
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), did not involve a free exercise challenge.
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922), dismissed on the ground that no substantial constitu-
tional question was presented, likewise did not involve a religious challenge.
173 People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952). The courts
have uniformly upheld the authority of the state to authorize the administration of blood
transfusions where the child's life is in danger, but differ where the child's life is not in
danger. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Family Ct. 1970),
aff'd mem., 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278
N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (authorizing transfusion for plastic surgery); In re
Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (parent's religious objections prevail where
child's life is not immediately endangered).
' State v. Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972) (authorizing removal of children's
adenoids and tonsils).
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not, by itself, improve the health of the population generally
or reduce the number of dependent individuals brought into
the world. The state might claim an interest in compelling am-
niocentesis so that the relatives of the carriers of genetic de-
fects can be informed of their danger, but this interest does
not seem substantial enough to overcome religious objections,
particularly since the subsequent birth of a genetically defec-
tive child will impart the same information to most relatives
who may be at risk.
However, should more genetic disorders become amen-
able to prenatal or immediate postnatal treatment, a combined
mandatory amniocentesis and treatment statute would serve to
protect the child from "ill health or death"'77 and hence might
withstand a free exercise challenge. At present, since abortion
is normally the only "cure" for those genetic disorders which
are diagnosable prenatally, any mandatory amniocentesis stat-
ute should contain an exemption for those who object to the
procedure on religious grounds.1
7 8
2. Compulsory Amniocentesis as an Unreasonable
Search of the Person
A statutory scheme mandating amniocentesis for all preg-
nant, at risk women would very likely be challenged as violative
of the fourth amendment's proscription of "unreasonable
searches and seizures."' 7 9 Such a challenge would probably
succeed under current fourth amendment law.
It is relatively certain that compulsory amniocentesis
would constitute a search under the principles of Schmerber v.
California.80 The Supreme Court there held a blood alcohol
test performed over Schmerber's objections to be a search.' 8 '
That aspect of the case is indistinguishable from a mandatory
amniocentesis regime; both involve state-imposed intrusions
into the body.
The fact that compulsory amniocentesis would not involve
a search for evidence of a crime, while Schmerber did, should
177 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944).
178 Of the states which have requirements that neonates be tested for phenylke-
tonuria, at least 29 provide exemptions for infants whose parents object on religious
grounds. See Swazey, supra note 122, at 909-12; N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-17-04 (1970);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-631 (Supp. 1974).
179 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
180 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
181 The Court held the search constitutionally permissible.
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:92
not be relevant to whether there is a search in the former sit-
uation. It is well established that the protections of the fourth
amendment are designed to protect citizens from intrusive state
activity itself; the nature of the proceeding is not germane to
the existence of the constitutional protection. Justice White
recognized this for the Court in Camara v. Municipal Court,'
8 2
where he stated, "It is surely anomalous to say that the indi-
vidual and his private property are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of
criminal behavior."'
183
The mandatory amniocentesis statute is arguably within
the Supreme Court's holding in Wyman v. James184 that a com-
pelled visit by a welfare department caseworker to a recipient's
home, carried out for the department's administrative pur-
poses over the recipient's objections, did not constitute a search.
Both situations involve an intrusion by the state into a person's
private domain in order to carry out the goals of an administra-
tive program. In neither case is the government attempting to
uncover evidence of crime. However, the Wyman decision was
predicated upon the Court's perception that the result of the
welfare recipient's refusal to allow the visit was not a "penalty";
it was merely the discontinuation of welfare payments, the
withdrawal of a state-granted benefit.185 To be effective, the
182 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
183 Id. at 530 (dictum) (footnote omitted). "The basic purpose of [the Fourth]
Amendment, as recognized in countess decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the pri-
vacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."
Id. at 528. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 254-56 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
The Court seemed to reaffirm this doctrine in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317
(1971). The Wyman Court appears to have been rather confused on the question, how-
ever. Compare id. at 317 ("[O]ne's Fourth Amendment protection subsists apart from his
being suspected of criminal behavior.") with id. at 323 (Assuming it is a search, a home
visit, see text accompanying note 184 infra, is a reasonable search because it "is not a
criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal investigation, and despite the an-
nounced fears of [appellee] and those who would join her, is not in aid of any criminal
proceeding."). The force of Justice White's Camara dictum, repeated in Wyman, is prob-
ably strong enough for the rule stated there to remain good law.
While almost all fourth amendment case law arises in the criminal context, lower
courts have recognized the applicability of the amendment to civil actions. See, e.g.,
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); United
States v. Undetermined Quantities of Depressant or Stimulant Drugs, 282 F. Supp. 543,
546 (S.D. Fla. 1968); Finkenburg Furniture Corp. v. Vasquez, 67 Misc. 2d 154, 158, 324
N.Y.S.2d 840, 846 (Civ. Ct. 1971) (dictum). See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 301-02 (1967) (dictum).
184 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
185 Id. at 325. But cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970): Welfare benefits
"are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their ter-
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amniocentesis statute must include a fine for noncompliance.
This use of an affirmative penalty distinguishes it from Wyman.
The search resulting from mandatory amniocentesis has
all the major characteristics of a regulatory search, a unique
type of search that has been given special consideration by the
Supreme Court. The constitutional limitations on regulatory
searches were set down in Camara v. Municipal Court,18 6 where
the Supreme Court held that the state interest in inspecting
residential structures for possible violations of a municipal
housing code is sufficient to justify searches of individual
houses upon presentation of a search warrant if one is re-
quested by the homeowner. This is true, the Court held, even
if there is probable cause to believe only that the houses in a
locale generally, rather than one house in particular, may be a
fire or health hazard. In other words, the probable cause stan-
dard in a regulatory search is one that applies to a whole popu-
lation rather than to a single individual. This standard for
probable cause was adopted by the Court because the aim of the
regulatory program-and hence the focus of the public's in-
terest-was "city-wide compliance with minimum physical stan-
dards for private property."'187 The need for the particular
search thus had to be viewed in the context of a generalized
public need, one which contrasts with the rather particularized
public interest in seizing evidence from a lone individual sus-
pected of criminal behavior, which requires a showing of prob-
able cause as to that single person.' 88 These aspects of the reg-
ulatory pattern in Camara are identical to those contemplated
by the mandatory amniocentesis statute. Under that statute,
the public interest does not lie in the inspection of any single in-
dividual. Rather, it is the broad, non-specific interest in deter-
mining whether any particular members of a rather large
population-at risk pregnant women-create a "hazard" for
the society by carrying a genetically defective fetus, one whose
birth the state has an economic interest in preventing for the
good of all.
mination involves state action that adjudicates important rights. The constitutional
challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are 'a "priv-
ilege" and not a "right."' " See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Dis-
tinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
186 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), a companion case
to Camara, involved a regulatory search of commercial structures, as distinguished from
Camara's residential buildings; the two cases reached the same results.
187 Id. at 535.
188 Id.
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In order to make searches of pregnant women within the
regulatory system established by the amniocentesis statute,
then, the state initially needs only to demonstrate probable
cause to believe that the general population of at risk pregnant
women creates a danger that the aims of the program will be
defeated if the searches do not take place. That showing is not
hard to make; decreasing the financial burden created by pub-
lic institutionalization of the genetically defective will not come
about easily without implementation of the amniocentesis pro-
gram.18
9
Before the searches can be allowed, however, even on a
showing of general probable cause, the state must show that
they are "reasonable."' 90 This requires a balancing of the state's
interests in the search against the privacy interests of the in-
dividual being searched '9'
The state's interests in the search have already been dis-
cussed. 92 The primary one is the indirect economic benefit of
not having to spend public monies on the care of genetically
defective citizens. The other interest is that of alleviating the in-
evitable pain and suffering felt by both parents and children
when someone is born with a genetic defect. Some of the factors
used by the Camara court in finding regulatory searches rea-
sonable apply by analogy to amniocentetic searches. For ex-
ample, one major reason for the Camara holding was that "the
public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be pre-
vented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing
technique would achieve acceptable results.' 93 The Court also
observed that an inspection not aimed at the discovery of evi-
dence of crime inherently involves a lesser intrusion into a per-
son's privacy than one that is. 194 Similarly, the analysis in Wyman
v. James included several elements that apply to the amniocen-
tetic search. Hypothesizing that the home visitation was a
189 It could better be argued that these goals could only be met with a more stringent
program-compulsory amniocentesis followed by compulsory abortion of fetuses deter-
mined to be genetically defective. See text accompanying notes 201-57 infra.
190 "It is unreasonableness which is the Fourth Amendment's standard. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)." Wyman v. James,.
400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971).
191 "[T]here can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by bal-
ancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
192 See text accompanying notes 161-62 supra.
193 387 U.S. at 537.194
Id. But cf. note, 181-83 supra & accompanying text.
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search, the Court concluded that it was a reasonable one. This
result was founded upon the public's special interest in the
dependent child whose family was receiving the welfare assis-
tance, the absence of any desire to obtain information about
criminal activity, and the fact that all the desired information
could be obtained only through a home visit.
195
While the state's interest in the amniocentesis statute
parallels those interests presented in Camara and Wyman, it is
certainly a much weaker one. Without mandatory abortion of
defective fetuses, there is no guarantee that the aim of the pro-
gram-economic savings for the state, and alleviation of the
pain and suffering that accompany the birth of a gentically de-
fective child-will ever be met. The state's interest is thus only
indirect at best.
In addition to the absence of a strong state interest, the
bodily interest of the pregnant woman would also make the
search unreasonable. Although the fourth amendment seems to
equate searches of "persons" with those of "houses," there is
good reason to believe that the privacy interest in a search of
the amniocentetic type-into the body-is stronger than the
personal interest involved in a search of the home or a mere
seizure of the person.' 96 The special consideration given
searches of this kind is perhaps best seen in the context of
border searches. Casual border searches of luggage, wallets,
purses, pockets, and the like can be made without any special
showing of probable cause. The courts typically hold that "there
is reason and probable cause to search every person entering
the United States from a foreign country, by reason of such
entry alone."1 97 When the state wants to search a body cavity,
however, the rule is different. A showing akin to the probable
cause normally required must then be made.
Henderson v. United States'98 is a classic example of the rec-
195 400 U.S. at 318, 321-22.
196 "Because we are dealing with intrusions into the human body rather than with
property relationships of private papers-houses, papers, and effects-we write on a
clean slate." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).
197 Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950
(1961). See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (dictum). The rule
has become so ingrained in our jurisprudence that courts rarely state the reason behind
it any more; they merely parrot the rule itself, and go on to the next question involved
in the case. See, e.g., United States v. Abarca-Espinoza, 440 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972); Bloomer v. United States, 409 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir.
1969).
198 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
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ognition that the increased privacy interest of the person being
searched requires the state to make a comparably higher show-
ing of probable cause. The government forced the appellant to
undergo a medical procedure in which two packets of heroin
were extracted from her vagina; the Ninth Circuit reversed the
conviction for the government's failure to show enough cause
for the intrusive search.
[I]f there is to be a more than casual examination of
the body, if in the course of the search of a woman
there is to be a requirement that she manually open
her vagina for visual inspection to see if she has some-
thing concealed there, we think that we should require
more than a mere suspicion. Surely, to require such a
performance is a serious invasion of personal privacy
and dignity, and so unlawful if "unwarranted."' 99
This statement is given extra force by the fact that in the same
opinion the court expressly restated the normal rule for border
searches: no probable cause, not even showing of mere suspi-
cion, need be shown.
200
The privacy interest presented in a mandatory amniocen-
tesis situation is thus greater than in the Camara or Wyman case,
where no bodily intrusion occurred. At the same time, the
state's interest was far stronger in those cases than in this. For
example, there is surely a stronger state interest in preventing a
ravaging fire in a large and densely populated urban area than
in preventing the birth of a relatively small number of geneti-
cally defective children, some of whom will never be a financial
burden on the state in any case. The relative strength of the in-
terests becomes even more clear when it is remembered that
the statutory scheme here proposed does not include compul-
sory abortion, so that the state has no way of ensuring that the
genetically defective fetuses discovered by amniocentesis will
not be born. The state's interest in searching a pregnant woman
to determine whether she is carrying a genetically defective
fetus must bow to the woman's greater interest in her own
bodily privacy, dignity, and integrity.
199 Id. at 808. Accord, United States v. Sosa, 469 F.2d 271, 272 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
200 390 F.2d at 806, 808 & n.3 (dictum).
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C. Mandatory Amniocentesis Followed by Compulsory
Abortion
We have seen more than once that the public welfare
may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would
be strange if it could not call upon those who already
sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices,
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order
to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It
is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to exe-
cute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
Mr. Justice Holmes
20 1
At least one legal expert believes that any mandatory
screening or prenatal diagnosis program will inevitably result
in compulsory abortion legislation. 202 He reasons that "those
[found to be carriers] who reject the ever more popular solu-
tion of abortion [will] appear more and more to be recalci-
trants."203 Hence, legislation will be enacted to force them into
line. While such a prophecy may seem far-fetched, it should
not be forgotten that compulsory sterilization statutes still exist
in twenty-one states.20 4 Under the current state of the law,
society thus is allowed to prevent the conception of potentially
201 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
202 Discussion following Green, Mechanisms for Public Policy Decision-Making, in ETH-
ICAL SYMPOSiUM, supra note 3, at 395, 399 (statement by Havighurst).
203 Id.
204 A partial list of these statutes can be found in Note, Governmental Control of Re-
search in Positive Eugenics, 7 J.L. REFORM 615, 616 n.13 (1974). See also Note, Eugenic
Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DENVER L.J. 631, 633 n.10 (1969). The rationale
behind such legislation is two-fold. First, it is presumed that mentally retarded women
are incapable of taking care of their offspring. Second, it is believed that mental retar-
dation is inherited and that society has an independent interest in preventing the birth
of defective offspring. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Subsequent to Buck, several lower courts have been called upon to decide the valid-
ity of compulsory sterilization laws. Several have declared the laws unconstitutional, but
their decisions were based on procedural inadequacies within the statute. See, e.g., Brewer
v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933); In re Hendrickson, 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123
P.2d 322 (1942). Those courts which have faced the issue of the substantive constitution-
ality of the statute have concluded that compulsory sterilization laws are valid. See,
e.g., State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 P. 668 (1931); In re Clayton, 120 Neb. 680,
234 N.W. 630 (1931).
During the fifty years since Buck, more than 70,000 retarded people have been ster-
ilized. E. OGG, SECURING THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF RETARDED PERSONS 8-9 (Public Affairs
Pamphlet No. 492, 1973). See also S. BRACKEL AND R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAw 207-25 (rev. ed. 1971).
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defective human beings. Does it not follow as a corollary that
society may also prevent the birth of potentially defective
human beings via mandatory abortion legislation? That is,
since the Supreme Court has held that a fetus, particularly
prior to viability, is not a person within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment,20 5 can there be any legal distinction
between preventing conception of the fetus and preventing
its birth? The following sections will discuss the definitional
and constitutional issues raised by any such proposal.
1. The Definitional Issue
But no perfection is so absolute,
That some impurity doth not pollute.20 6
It is unlikely that a sensible, workable, and humane man-
datory abortion system could ever be created; it would be im-
possible to establish guidelines determining which genetic dis-
orders were serious enough to warrant mandatory action. Both
the number and the nature of diseases which are amenable to
prenatal diagnosis are expanding.20 7 Moreover, it is possible
that many presently incurable genetic diseases will eventually
become treatable, either prenatally or post-natally. In each
case, the legislature would have to decide if the development of
a cure warranted removing the defect from the mandatory
abortion list. Any statute or regulation setting forth concrete
guidelines concerning which disorders must be aborted would
have to be amended frequently.
An alternative would be to establish a board20 8 with broad
discretion to determine which pregnancies must be terminated.
However, even assuming that each board member possessed a
205 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
206 W. SHAKESPEARE, RAPE OF LUCRECE, 11. 853-54.
207 See, e.g., Bloom, Schmickel, Barr & Burdi, Prenatal Diagnosis ofAutosomal Mosaicism
84 J. PEDIATRICS, No. 5, at 732 (1974); see generally Nadler, supra note 30.
20' An existing analogy can be found in a current Oregon statute which has created
a "Board of Social Protection" to administer the state's compulsory sterilization law.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 436.010-.150 (1973). This board, which consists of physicians and
mental health workers, is empowered to order sterilization of any person if their pro-
creation would produce, inter alia, children "who would have an inherited tendency to
mental retardation or mental illness." ORE. REV. STAT. § 436.020, .050, .070. A 1961
opinion of the Oregon Attorney General contains a list of persons who are candidates
for compulsory sterilization. Among these are:
Feeble-minded, insane, epileptic, habitual criminals, incurable syphilitics, moral
degenerates or sexual perverts, who are, or, in the opinion of the institution
heads, are likely to become menaces to society .... [and] persons convicted of
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high degree of knowledge of genetics and would always act in
good faith, the potential for abuse of such a system would be
awesome. First, the line of demarcation between the normal
and abnormal is often unclear.20 9 Even more importantly, in
the absence of concrete guidelines, the board's functions would
never cease. If some groups of genetic diseases were eliminated,
through either abortion or treatment, the board would prob-
ably shift its focus to other, perhaps less severe, forms of illness.
For example, many genetically disabled youngsters are mentally
retarded. But
retardation cannot be "wiped out," because it is de-
fined in relative terms. If all those presently defined
as retarded are wished out of sight tomorrow, then
society would simply turn its attention to a new group
to whom it would give the same label, the same worry,
the same treatment or neglect.
210
Moreover, even if "genetic imperfection" could be defined
and a workable system could be created for aborting those
"qualifying," a mandatory abortion program would undoubt-
edly give rise to serious constitutional questions.
2. Does the Right of "Procreational Privacy"
Encompass the Right to Give Birth to a
Disabled Child?
21a
Any compulsory abortion proposal would raise first and
fourth amendment issues similar to those considered in the
discussion of mandatory amniocentesis. In addition, compul-
sory abortion legislation may impermissibly infringe on the
right of "procreational privacy," enunciated in a series of Su-
... an act of sustained osculatory relations with the private parts of any person,
or permitting such relations.
1960-62 Op. Air'y GEN. ORE. 139.
209 See note 114 supra & accompanying text. See also Littlefield, Milunsky & Jacoby,
supra note 56, at 43, 48.
210 Seeley, "The Law of Retardation and the Retardation of the Law," in MENTAL RE-
TARDATION AND THE LAW: BULLETIN OF THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CHIL-
DREN, June, 1964, at 6-7.
211 This section deals with the constitutional rights of parents. If the state chose to
enforce the statute through denial of state assistance in the rearing of a child born in
violation of the statute (instead of the more likely sanction of criminal penalties against
the parents), then the child's constitutional rights would also be implicated.
For example, two federal courts have recently held that retarded and disabled chil-
dren have a constitutional right to public-supported education when such educational
opportunity is afforded other children. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
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preme Court decisions beginning with Skinner v. Oklahoma 212
and culminating in Roe v. Wade.
213
In Skinner the Supreme Court invalidated a statute which
provided for the compulsory sterilization of persons who had
been convicted two or more times of certain classes of felonies,
but which expressly excluded those convicted of "white collar"
felonies, such as embezzlement. In holding that the law vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment by laying "an unequal hand
on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of
offense," the Court referred to the right to procreate as "a basic
liberty" and "one of the basic rights of man.
214
Although Skinner struck down a law which prevented cer-
tain people from procreating, the decision was used as authority
for the invalidation of laws which, in effect, promoted pro-
creation. In Griswold v. Connecticut,215 the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute which forbade the use of
contraceptives. Citing Skinner, the Court held that the statute
had a "maximum destructive impact upon [the marital] rela-
tionship," 21 6 and that the privacy of that relationship was pro-
tected by the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
2 1 7
1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
Pa. 1972). Moreover, in many jurisdictions legislation has recently been enacted requir-
ing publicly financed education for all disabled children. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 45, §
252(a9) (Supp. 1973); these statutes are summarized and discussed in Abeson, Movement
and Momentum: Government and the Education of Handicapped Children, 39 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 63 (1972). However, some state laws contain a ceiling on how many disabled
students can be given financial aid. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6752 (West Supp. 1974).
In jurisdictions covered by these laws and decisions, could the state deny educational
aid to those youngsters whose conditions were (or could have been) prenatally diag-
nosed, and whose parents refused to have them aborted?
Such a measure would punish the child solely because of the action (or the inaction)
of the parents, and would be unconstitutional under the analogous recent Supreme
Court rulings in illegitimacy cases. The Court has repeatedly held that the state may not
deny public benefits to a child solely on grounds of illegitimacy, because to do so "is con-
trary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relation-
ship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing." Jimenez v. Weinberger, 94 S. Ct. 2496,
2499 (1974) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
See also New Jersey Welfare Rights Org'n v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971).
212 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
213 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
214 316 U.S. at 541.
215 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2 16 Id. at 485.
217 Id. at 484.
Another case in this line, dealing with the privacy of the home but not specifically
with procreation, is Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), where the Court held that
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Six years later, the Court made it clear that the right to
procreate or not to procreate extended to all individuals,
married or not. Eisenstadt v. Baird21 8 invalidated a Massachusetts
law which forbade distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons. In holding that contraception was a fundamental right
and that it therefore must be equally available to married and
unmarried persons, the Court stated: "If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child. 21a
Finally, in invalidating the Texas anti-abortion statute in
Roe v. Wade,220 the Supreme Court concluded that "the right of
personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but . . . this
right is not unqualified and must be considered against impor-
tant state interests in regulation. 2 2'
These decisions indicate that there is a constitutional right
to privacy which includes rights to procreate or to refrain from
procreation, to terminate a pregnancy, and, by implication, to
refrain from terminating a pregnancy. These rights are not
absolute, however, and may be abridged if the state can advance
an interest which is "sufficiently compelling.
222
The question thus presented is whether the state has a
compelling interest in preventing the birth of disabled off-
spring and whether a compulsory abortion statute is an appro-
priate instrument for the achievement of that goal. A state
might advance three possible justifications for the enactment of
such a statute: eugenics, euthanasiac and economics. But none
of these is a legitimate, let alone "compelling" rationale for a
compulsory abortion law.
"the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime."
Id. at 559. The Court distinguished "mere private possession" from the facts in prior
obscenity cases, which had dealt with public distribution or use of the mails to disseminate
obscene material. Id. at 560-64. Stanley's conviction was reversed because the usual
first amendment interests were supplemented by the "fundamental ... right to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
privacy .... [S]tatutes regulating obscenity . . . do not . . . reach into the privacy of
one's own home." Id. at 564-65.
218 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
2 19 Id. at 453.
220 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See notes 135-44 supra & accompanying text.
221 Id. at 154.
2 22 Id.
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a. Eugenics 223
Laws and proposals which aim to improve human stock
through the manipulation of heredity are not new in this
country. For example, in 1922, advocates of negative eugenics
proposed a model eugenical sterilization law which would have
subjected the following classes of persons to compulsory steril-
ization:
(1) Feeble minded; (2) Insane (including psycho-
pathic); (3) Criminalistic (including the delinquent and
wayward); (4) Epileptic; (5) Inebriate (including drug-
habitues); (6) Diseased (including the tuberculous, the
syphilitic, the leprous, and others with chronic, infec-
tious and legally segregable diseases); (7) Blind in-
cluding those with seriously impaired vision); (8) Deaf
(including those with seriously impaired hearing); (9)
Deformed (including the crippled); and (10) Depen-
dent (including orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless,
tramps, and paupers).
224
Fortunately, this provision was not enacted in any state, and the
influence of those advocating such measures declined sharply
in the 1930's, when their notions of national purity became
associated in the public mind with the Nazi ideal.225 In recent
years, however, there has been increased interest in eugenics.226
As the focus has shifted from the elimination of social faults to
the deletion of biological flaws, the concept of human improve-
ment through the manipulation of heredity may be regaining
respectability.
Against this very abbreviated background, the following
issue is raised: Is there a compelling state interest in improving
the biological lot of mankind and in using mandatory abortion
of disabled fetuses as an instrument to achieve this end? It is
223 Eugenics assumes that certain types of individuals are socially more
desirable than others, and it proposes to improve future generations by
increasing the proportion of individuals of desirable types through decreas-
ing the rate of propagation of the inferior individuals (negative eugenics)
and increasing that of the superior individuals (positive eugenics).
Jennings, Eugenics, 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 617, 618-19 (1931).
224 H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 446-47 (1922).
22 Note, Governmental Control of Research in Positive Eugenics, 7 J.L. REFORM 615,
616-17 (1974).
22 See, e.g., Littlefield, Prenatal Diagnosis and Therapeutic Abortion, 280 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 722, 723 (1969).
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arguable that Buck v. Bell2 27 and its progeny228 have already
given judicial imprimatur to negative eugenics, and that man-
datory abortion is a less restrictive alternative than the proce-
dure which was sanctioned in those cases-compulsory steril-
ization. That is, if society is deeply committed to a particular
eugenic goal such as the eradication of the gene associated with
Tay-Sachs disease, then the propriety of mandatory abortion to
achieve this end would have to be measured against other pos-
sible alternatives, such as restrictions on intramarriage between
Ashkenazi Jews, restrictions on marriage between known
heterozygotes, or compulsory sterilization of couples when
both partners are known heterozygotes. Restriction on intra-
marriage between Ashkenazi Jews or known heterozygotes,
although recently advocated by a French geneticist,2 29 is the
most sweeping and probably the most clearly unconstitu-
tional230 option. Compulsory sterilization, while arguably con-
stitutional,231 also seems to be a more drastic measure than
would be needed. To sterilize heterozygote couples would be
to deny them the right to give birth to unafflicted and even
non-carrier offspring 232 and therefore would probably be con-
stitutionally overbroad. 233 Mandatory abortion would be a
much less restrictive alternative. It would eliminate defective
fetuses, while in no way interfering with the parents' right to
give birth to unaffected progeny.
However, mandatory abortion of defective fetuses would
not only be the least restrictive negative eugenics measure; it
would also be the least effective. A law mandating abortion of
all fetuses afflicted with, for example, Tay-Sachs disease, would
not eliminate or even reduce the incidence of that particular
deleterious gene in the human gene pool. Indeed, some geneti-
cists believe that the elimination of afflicted fetuses will actually
227 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See text accompanying note 201 supra.
228 See cases cited in note 204 supra.
229 See discussion following Fraser, Survey of Counseling Practices, in ETHICAL SYMIPO-
SiUM, supra note 3, at 17 (statement by Lejeune).
230 It would run counter to Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (alternative
holding).
231 See notes 227-28 supra & accompanying text.
232 There is a 25% probability that any child born to two Tay-Sachs carriers will be
homozygous normal. See note 16 supra & accompanying text.
233 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960).
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increase the incidence of such genes, 234 because a parent who is
forced to abort a disabled child might desire to "replace" him.
The replacement child has a fifty percent probability of being a
non-affected carrier of the gene. Whereas the homozygote, had
he not been aborted, would probably not have survived to child-
bearing age, the heterozygote will-and he may, in turn, pass
the gene on to his own progeny, thus necessitating an ever-in-
creasing number of genetic abortions.
Hence, a mandatory abortion law would be a truly effec-
tive eugenics measure only if it required the abortion not only
of afflicted fetuses but also of carriers. Carriers are, of course,
phenotypically normal, will not suffer, and will not be a burden
to their families or to society. To deny their parents the right
to give them birth because of a long range eugenics goal would
be to destroy any right of procreational privacy, and would
undoubtedly be unconstitutional. 35
b. Euthanasia
In contrast to eugenics, euthanasia ostensibly focuses on
the lot of the individual rather than of society; it contemplates
the alleviation of human suffering via the "mercy killing" of
disabled fetuses. The legal and moral obstacles to such an ap-
proach are obvious. Euthanasia has met with almost complete
rejection from the courts.2 36 A few decisions which have given
judicial sanction to the notion of withholding treatment have
predicated their opinions upon the refusal of the dying person
to submit to it.237 The issue in these cases was not whether the
state (or another individual) can make the decision to terminate
.human life, but whether an individual can consent to his own
natural death.238 The fetus obviously is not capable of having
234 See, e.g., Hall, The Concerns of Doctors and Patients, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 3, at 23, 20-31.
235 A less drastic eugenic goal, such as the abortion of afflicted fetuses only, would
not be truly eugenic as applied to most genetic defects detectable through amniocen-
tesis, for children afflicted with such defects are seldom able to procreate. The justifica-
tions for such a goal must therefore rest in the alleviation of suffering and in economics.
236 See, e.g., Note, Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, 6 ALB. L. REV. 674, 675 (1972). Never-
theless, juries often acquit defendants charged with such killings. See Morris, Voluntary
Euthanasia, 45 WASH. L. REV. 239, 241-42 & n.7 (1970).
237 See, e.g., Guardianship of Gertrude Raasch, No. 455-996 (Milwaukee County Ct.
P. Div., Jan. 25, 1972), discussed in Sullivan, The Dying Person-His Plight and His Right,
8 NEw ENG. L. REV. 197 (1973); cf In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972);
Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
238 Some courts have disregarded even a clear refusal by the patient to be treated.
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desires, much less making them known, but at least one court
has postulated that a disabled fetus, if given a choice, "would
almost surely choose life with defects as against no life at all."'239
If the courts adopt this approach generally, a mandatory abor-
tion statute would certainly not be justifiable on the basis of
euthanasia. Even if no assumptions were made regarding the
desire of the fetus to live, the only persons who would be capa-
ble of giving their consent to euthanasia would be the parents
of the genetically imperfect fetus; yet even their wishes would
be totally ignored by a mandatory abortion statute. Thus, the
state would have to argue that such consent is neither necessary
nor appropriate because prospective parents do not understand
the nature of genetic disease or the suffering that it entails ,240
that the government has the right to coerce prospective parents
into doing what is "best" for themselves and their unborn prog-
eny.241 Courts should not be expected to sanction this ap-
proach while firmly rejecting euthanasia for adults. Although
the state's case is stronger because of the ruling that fetuses are
not persons within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment,242 the argument that parents are incapable of making a
sound decision with respect to their interests and those of the
child would appear to be foreclosed by Roe v. Wade and its pre-
decessors.
2 43
Beyond these legal barriers to euthanasia as a justification
for mandatory abortion is the moral rejoinder so vividly pre-
See, e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Powell v. Columbian
Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
239 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 30, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1966).
240 One recent study, for example, involved 42 families of children with phenylke-
tonuria who attended a hospital clinic. The parents were repeatedly counseled with re-
spect to the basic facts, genetic and metabolic, about their child's disease and treatment.
In addition to frequent discussions, the parents were given pamphlets containing the
pertinent material concerning the disease. However, when parents were asked to write
in essay form their understanding of the nature of the disease, potential consequences
and treatment, only 19% were able to give adequate answers. See discussion following
Migeon, The Concerns of Doctors and Patients, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 32-
33 (statement by Migeon).
241 Although courts have on occasion overruled the stated desire of parents in mak-
ing life or death decisions for their children, they have done so only when the parents
have jeopardized the life of the child by refusing medical treatment-clearly not the
same as overruling parents who have decided that they wish to allow their defective
child to live. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); In re Brooklyn Hospital, 45 Misc. 2d 914, 258
N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
242 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
243 Notes 212-22 supra & accompanying text.
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:92
sented several years ago by Professor Yale Kamisar, who quoted
the following parable: "At the Crystal Palace Aquarium not
long ago I saw a crab euthanatising a sickly fish, doubtless from
the highest motives. ' 244 More recently, a prominent theologian
expressed a similar viewpoint: "Whenever a strong group
argues on behalf of a weaker group that their removal would be
better than their survival, we should not be duly impressed. 2 45
A mandatory abortion law can never be justified with certainty
on the basis of humaneness toward the fetus. Perhaps "[a]bor-
tion is never therapeutic for the fetus.
246
c. The Economic Interest of the State
To statutorily compel the abortion of defective fetuses on
the ground that they represent a potential drain on economic
resources may be not only "unjust, insensitive and outra-
geous,' '2 47 but also unconstitutional. Several recent decisions
have indicated that the state cannot deny fundamental rights
merely because the exercise of those rights will be economically
burdensome on the state. In Mills v. Board of Education,248 for
example, the District Court for the District of Columbia de-
clared that mentally retarded children are entitled to receive
public education on a par with other children. The school dis-
trict could not justify its failure to provide that education on
the ground that it lacked sufficient economic resources.
249
If economic burden is not sufficient to justify a denial of
equal education to the mentally retarded, it would seem that
the right to bear a child-a more fundamental right25 0-should
not be infringeable merely because a particular child would be
an economic burden on the state. The compulsory steriliza-
244 Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42
MINN. L. REv. 970 (1958) (quoting anonymous letter to the editor, 46 The Spectator 241
(1873)).
245 Fletcher, Parents in Genetic Counseling: The Moral Shape of Decision-Making, in
ETHICAL Symposium, supra note 3, at 301, 323.
24 6 Id.
247 Callahan, The Meaning and Significance of Genetic Disease: Philosophical Perspectives,
in ETHICAL Symposium, supra note 3, at 83, 86.
248 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
24 9 Id. at 876. See also Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
250 The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the right to procreate is a fun-
damental right. See notes 212-22 supra & accompanying text. The Court recently held,
however, that education is not a fundamental right. San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973).
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tion cases which hold to the contrary generally predate the
modern development of the constitutional right of procrea-
tional privacy,2 51 and should not be relied on as precedent.
Although Roe v. Wade cited Buck v. Bell with approval, 252 a
direct confrontation between them would require a complete
rethinking of the older cases in light of subsequent constitu-
tional developments. No prediction can be certain, but it seems
unlikely that the state could muster an economic case suffi-
cient to overcome a childbearing right. While it is true that the
cost of caring for some disabled children may be very high
2 53
the rationale underlying the compulsory sterilization cases
seems inapplicable in that, in those cases, there was a substantial
likelihood that the mother, who was mentally retarded, would
not be able to care for her child, and that the child therefore
would become a public charge.254 Carriers of genetic defects
are not necessarily similarly handicapped. Many of these wom-
en and their husbands may be capable, financially, intellec-
tually, and emotionally, of caring for their disabled offspring.
Compelling them to terminate their pregnancies would not
necessarily conserve the economic resources of the state.
255
In the final analysis, however, the argument for the un-
constitutionality of mandatory abortion is based not so much on
the weakness of the state's economic interest as on the peculiar
251 See text accompanying notes 212-22 supra.
252 410 U.S. at 154.
253 It has been roughly estimated, for example, that in the United States the cost of
institutionalizing and maintaining persons afflicted with Down's syndrome (mongolism)
is $1.7 billion each year. Etzioni, Doctors Know More than They're Telling You about Genet-
ic Defects, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 1973, at 26, 35.
254 E.g., In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962); see also note 204 supra.
255 This presents an interesting problem for drafters of legislation. Assuming that
economics is a valid justification for mandatory abortion, and that there is no other
valid justification, a statute imposing criminal penalties on all women who refuse to
abort their defective offspring could be constitutionally overbroad. See United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). But in order to
cure this defect, by reaching only those pregnancies which present potential economic
burdens to the state, a mandatory abortion statute might discriminate against parents
on the basis of wealth. This might produce equal protection problems. The Supreme
Court has required the state to show a compelling interest in order to classify on the
basis of wealth only when fundamental rights have been at stake. See, e.g., Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (right to court-appointed counsel on direct criminal appeal); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to receive a transcript of criminal trial in order to
perfect an appeal); but see Ross v. Moffit, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974) (no right to appointed
counsel for second, discretionary criminal appeal). In the absence of a fundamental
right, however, the Supreme Court "has never . . . held that wealth discrimination
alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny .... " San Antonio Inde-
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strength of the countervailing individual interests. Those with
religious convictions against abortion would almost certainly
be granted an exemption from a compulsory statute.25 6 More
generally, those who otherwise objected could argue that abor-
tion against their will would violate not only the new concept of
procreational privacy, but also the prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures. 257 Such a clear, direct infringement on
these two powerful doctrines, the one so conceptual and the
other so graphic, is unlikely to prevail.
The argument for the unconstitutionality of mandatory
amniocentesis, on the other hand, derives from the absence of
any legitimate state interest-for amniocentesis itself, when not
coupled with abortion, will not reduce the number of genetically
disabled persons brought into the world. As long as abortion
remains the only "cure" for genetic disease, a mandatory pre-
natal diagnosis program seems unwarranted. However, should
more congenital disorders become amenable to prenatal or
immediate postnatal treatment, a compulsory amniocentesis
program might be justifiable on the basis of alleviating suffer-
ing or conserving economic resources and hence might with-
stand constitutional attack.
At present, a governmentally funded voluntary amniocen-
tesis program seems the most feasible. The Tay-Sachs experi-
ence indicates that most parents who are at risk will opt for pre-
natal diagnosis and abortion of a fetus diagnosed as afflicted
with a genetic defect.258 The number of genetically defective
children who would then become a burden to themselves,
their parents, and the state would be only a fraction of the
200,000 currently born annually.
259
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973). See id. at 121 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
When faced with a mandatory abortion statute that is applied only to women whose
children, if born, would potentially become a financial burden on the state, courts
should give cognizance to the possibility that the right to refuse to terminate a pregnan-
cy may be a fundamental one. See text accompanying note 222 supra. If this status is
given such a refusal, the courts would be required to apply the compelling state interest
test to the statutory classification; it is highly unlikely that the statute could withstand
scrutiny under that test.
256 There is no precedent that is even analogous, but a contrary ruling in a case of
such direct infringement of free exercise is almost unthinkable.
2'7 See notes 179-84 supra & accompanying text.
258 See notes 130-33 supra & accompanying text. But see note 162 supra.
259 See note 1 supra & accompanying text. Of those parents who would not voluntar-
ily abort an afflicted fetus, a considerable number would probably be acting out of
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III. A MALPRACTICE ACTION FOR WRONGFUL LIFE
Regardless of whether the procedure is ultimately reg-
ulated by statute, the proliferating use of amniocentesis
will, in all likelihood, generate the usual gamut of mal-
practice actions. Among these are suits arising from the
mishandling of the procedure, 260 misdiagnosis resulting in
the abortion of a "healthy" fetus,26' the physician's fail-
religious conviction. Compulsory abortion would trespass much more directly than
mandatory amniocentesis on the free exercise of religion, see note 169 supra & accompa-
nying text, and the legislature or courts might well carve out a religious exception to a
mandatory abortion statute. See generally notes 170-78 supra & accompanying text. If so,
the extra number of burdensome children from a completely voluntary program would
be smaller still.
260 Problems of causation, while inherent in all malpractice litigation, will obvious-
ly be seriously compounded when the suit involves a fetal injury allegedly caused by the
mishandling of an amniocentesis. Unlike any other surgical diagnostic procedure,
amniocentesis involves two patients, one of whom has never been seen by the doctor or
by any other witness. Rather than being indicative of a physician's negligence, fetal
injuries may be the result of an unrelated trauma or an aberrational response, which
can neither be reported by the fetus nor perceived by those who know him. For ex-
ample, when a neonate is born with an injured eye, how can one ever be certain that it
was amniocentesis rather than a forceps delivery or a congenital defect which brought
about the damage?
261 This problem was recently discussed by two medical experts on amniocentesis.
Dr. Elliot Vesell of the Department of Pharmacology of Pennsylvania State University
stated:
I have heard of a diagnosis of severe chromosomal abnormality made on the
basis of karyotype analysis on only a single culture of amniotic fluid. The
pregnancy was interrupted by abortion, and an entirely normal fetus was
found. What should the parents be told?
Dr. Peter Condliffe, of the National Institutes of Health's Fogarty International Center,
argued:
Is this any different from appendectomies in which perhaps one appendix in
every five removed is not diseased? The surgeon has intervened usually for a
good reason, and no damage is done, but there were risks. I think in many
cases, nothing at all is said to the patient.
Discussion following Motulsky, The Significance of Genetic Disease, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 3, at 70.
The doctor's liability for aborting a healthy fetus, may, however, be significantly
greater than the liability resulting from the removal of a healthy appendix. Should the
doctor's misdiagnosis result in the genetic abortion of a "healthy" fetus, a cause of
action for wrongful death might lie. The right of prospective parents to bring such
suits in cases of fetal death caused by the negligent operation of motor vehicles has
been recognized in many jurisdictions, e.g., Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1
(1962), but not in some others, e.g., Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d
229 (1951). For a more thorough listing of cases, see Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967).
Recovery, where permitted, has been limited to situations involving wrongful death of
a viable fetus-i.e., one capable of extrauterine life. See Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706
(D. Alas. 1962). This restriction, however, need not necessarily apply to wrongful death
resulting from an abortion based on misdiagnosis of the fetal genetic composition. A
major rationale behind the "viability" limitation has been the courts' inability to ascer-
tain the existence of proximate cause between the defendant's act and fetal death or in-
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ure to consult with a specialist, 262 failure to inform the pa-
tient of risks inherent in the procedure, 263  and products
juries in early gestation. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 337-38
(4th ed. 1971). Clearly, any such causation problem would be eliminated if fetal death
resulted from the doctor's intentional performance of a genetic abortion.
Another rationale for denying recovery is that the fetus upon its death was still
part of its mother. Id. at 357. This would seem consistent with the Supreme Court
declaration, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973), that "the word 'person,' as used
in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." The Court later rational-
ized the coexistence of its decision with wrongful death actions on behalf of fetuses:
"Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and
is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality
of life." Id. at 162.
In fact, it has been said that when the wrongful death action is denied the woman
may still recover for both physical and mental injuries, including emotional upset, attend-
ing still birth. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 487, 248 N.E.2d 901, 906, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65, 72 (1969).
262 Doctors and lawyers have suggested that states may eventually license genetic
counseling as a medical specialty. E.g., Singer, supra note 123, at 35. See also Green,
Mechanisms for Public Policy Decision-Making, in ETHICAL SYMPOsIuM, supra note 3, at 385,
389. If this occurs, perhaps the courts will establish a duty on the part of general prac-
titioners to seek advice from a genetic counselor as part of standard practice in advising
pregnant patients, especially when a patient's history reveals that she or the child's
father may be a carrier of a particular disease.
It is well established that physicians are duty bound under certain circumstances ei-
ther to seek a consultation or to advise their patients that such an opportunity exists.
In Morgan v. Engles, 372 Mich. 514, 127 N.W.2d 382 (1964), for example, the Supreme
Court of Michigan held that a doctor's failure to consult a specialist in setting an infant's
broken arm could be sufficient as the proximate cause of permanent damage that would
have been avoided by a specialist. Likewise, in Steeves v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 446
(D.S.C. 1968), a federal district court held that a physician's failure to obtain a con-
sultation was negligent and was the proximate cause of plaintiff's ruptured appendix;
hence, the plaintiff recovered.
The "duty to consult" argument is further buttressed by the American Medical
Association's Principles of Medical Ethics, which include the duty to "seek consultation
... in doubtful or difficult cases." Principles of Medical Ethics § 8, in AMERICAN MEDICAL
Ass'N, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 45 (1971).
16' See generally Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent", 36 FORD. L. REV. 639, 640-
48 (1968); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628
(1969); Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1396 (1967); Note,
Failure to Inform as Medical Malpractice, 23 VAND. L. REV. 754 (1970).
In the landmark case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957), the California District Court of Appeal
held that a physician will be culpable for malpractice "if he withholds any facts which
are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment." A subsequent California decision characterized the "informed consent" re-
quirement as follows:
[T]he patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the physician's duty to
reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses ad-
equate information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician's
communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need,
and that need is whatever information is material to the decision. Thus the test
for determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality
to the patient's decision.
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liability.264
Moreover, it is conceivable that prenatal diagnosis will
give rise to some rather unique tort problems, based on a phy-
sician's failure to perform the procedure or his inaction subse-
quent to an amniocentesis which has revealed a fetal defect.
The uniqueness of these problems derives from the possibility
that such failure or inaction might give rise not only to a tradi-
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972) (cita-
tion omitted). While this "materiality of peril" language has been used often, it has
been defined rarely. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, supra, at 638-41; Note, CAL. L. REV.,
supra, at 1407 n.68. Some courts seem to have confused the concept of "materiality"
with that of probability, and have apparently denied recovery merely because the risk
of the resultant complication was relatively low. In Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393
P.2d 982 (1964), modified on other grounds, 194 Kan. 675, 401 P.2d 659 (1965), for ex-
ample, the plaintiff brought suit against a hospital and eye surgeon for damages result-
ing from a post-cataract surgery infection which required removal of an eye. After
noting that the risk of this post-operative complication was approximately one percent,
the court held that the physician was under no duty to forewarn of risks which occurred
with such a low frequency:
[Plaintiff] ... would have this court extend the duty of a physician or surgeon
to the extreme where he would have to apprise his patient not only of the known
risks but also of each infinitesimal, imaginative, or speculative element that
would go into making up such risks.
193 Kan. at 333, 393 P.2d at 991.
It is submitted that a risk of one percent (which is the approximate risk of fetal-
maternal damage incident to amniocentesis, see note 74 supra & accompanying text) is
neither "infinitesimal" nor "speculative" and should be disclosed to the patient prior
to surgery. A material risk is any risk which is pertinent to a patient's freedom of choice,
and therefore involves not only probability, but also severity-both of which must be
balanced against the patient's informed view of the necessity and desirability of submit-
ting to the procedure.
It could be suggested that the average patient is not capable of balancing the risk
of surgery against its desirability, that he or she lacks the capacity to make an intelli-
gent choice. This argument, in addition to being paternalistic, seems particularly inap-
plicable to amniocentesis patients, for often there will be no objective medical criteria
as to what constitutes a wise choice. Consider, for example, the plight of a 42-year-old
woman who desperately desires to have a child, but does not wish to give birth to a
mongoloid. Only she and her spouse (and not the physician) can possibly weigh all the
subjective factors involved in deciding whether to submit to amniocentesis (in which
case there is a one to two percent risk of fetal or maternal injury or death), or to re-
frain (in which case there is a slightly less than one percent probability that the child
will be afflicted with Down's syndrome).
Believing that the informed consent doctrine requires physicians to explain the pos-
sible hazards and limitations of amniocentesis to the patient, one prominent amniocen-
tesis specialist, Dr. M. Neil Maclntyre of Cleveland, requires both the patient and her
husband to sign an "Informed Consent and Release" form. This form apprises the pa-
tient of the specific risk of "premature labor possibly resulting in spontaneous abor-
tion," as well as the general risk of other "damage to the mother or fetus." Discussion
in EARLY DIAGNOSIS SymPosIuM, supra note 3, at 144-45 (statement by MacIntyre).
264 See generally Note, The Medical Profession and Strict Liability for Defective Products-
A Limited Extension, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 359 (1965).
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tional malpractice action by the parents, but also to a "wrong-
ful life" action on behalf of the child who is born as a result of
the physician's tortious action or inaction.
A. Contexts in Which the Problem Might Arise
An action based on the idea that the child should have been
aborted could arise from a doctor's failure to perform amnio-
centesis, misdiagnosis to the effect that the fetus is healthy,
failure to inform the parents of the results of the amniocentesis,
or refusal to perform an abortion.
In general, the standard of care required of a physician is
one of applying "customary and usual" procedures and knowl-
edge.265 If amniocentesis becomes customary and usual, a phy-
sician who, out of negligence or ignorance, neglects to per-
form the test on a high risk patient will have violated this
standard.26 6 On the other hand, well informed and careful
doctors might also refuse to conduct the test even for a woman
at risk, because of a scarcity of medical and diagnostic facilities.
This would be a valid defense to a malpractice action, 267 if the
exclusion of the particular patient was based on a reasonable
method of allocation.
2 68
The situation in which the fetus is misdiagnosed as healthy
speaks for itself; beyond that, however, is the position of some
doctors who believe that certain fetal abnormalities, such as
sex chromosome aberrations, do not justify genetic abortion,
and that disclosure to the parents might adversely affect the
future rearing of the child.269 Moreover, full disclosure is a
265 
W. PRossER, supra note 261, § 32, at 165.
266 Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 976, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 391 (1971);
W. PROSSER, supra note 261, § 32, at 165; discussion following Green, Mechanisms for
Public Policy Decision-Making, in ETHICAL SymPosIum, supra note 3, at 400 (statement by
Havighurst); discussion following Littlefield, Milunsky & Jacoby, Prenatal Genetic Diag-
nosis: Status and Problems, in ETHICAL SymIposiuM, supra note 3, at 54 (statement by
Singer).
267 Where resources are inadequate, their use cannot be customary and widespread.
"Hence whenever there is an allocation problem there can be no malpractice prob-
lem." Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 629-30 (1969).
268 In general, the appropriate basis at the present time would appear to be the
statistical odds. For example, a pregnant woman over the age of 35 has a slightly less
than one percent chance of giving birth to a mongoloid child, see note 40 supra. Her need
for amniocentesis would normally be less than that of two mates who are both heterozy-
gous for Tay-Sachs disease; they have a twenty-five percent chance of conceiving an af-
flicted fetus, see note 16 supra & accompanying text.
269 See, e.g., Lubs, Privacy and Genetic Information, in ETHICAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note
3, at 267, 270.
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difficult and time-consuming task. As Professor Alexander
Capron has noted, in a slightly different context,
[T]he really "efficient" course for most counselors is
not full disclosure on a computer print-out, but the
withholding of information which if disclosed would
involve the counselor in a long and arduous process
of truly "counseling" his patients. In short, it is more
"efficient" (and certainly easier) for him to make the
choices himself rather than to bring into open discus-
sion facts . . . which are difficult to contemplate or
discuss.
27 0
It appears, however, that the withholding of such infor-
mation might be medical malpractice. Some courts have found
that a physician has a duty to reveal to a patient, or to one
properly acting for him, the nature of the patient's ailment.271
Other authorities differ with respect to the patient stricken
with a fatal illness,272 contending that in such a case the "bru-
tal" truth serves no useful purpose, and may in fact exacerbate
the patient's disease; but this objection would not apply to the
case of a diagnosed fetal genetic defect. If disclosure suffi-
cient to assure informed consent to therapy is the legal norm,
27 3
then this principle should encompass the patient's right to re-
ceive information which will provide informed consent to non-
therapy-that is, carrying the fetus to term.
Another conceivable legal duty of a physician would be
to carry out a requested abortion if amniocentesis has revealed
a genetic defect. Normally a physician who abandons his pa-
tient is liable for breach of contract 27 4 or of a "duty under-
taken"; 275 but the physician in this case may argue that the
fetal defect is not of sufficient magnitude to justify an abor-
270 Capron, Legal Rights and Moral Rights, in ETHICAL SyMposIuM, supra note 3, at
221,229.
271 Lester v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 240 F.2d 676,,679 (5th Cir. 1957); Natanson
v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 403, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960); see Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 501
(1973).
272 Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from Patient Sick With
Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REv. 349, 351 (1946); see Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344
Mass. 136, 144, 181 N.E.2d 562, 567 (1962) (Spiegel, J., dissenting); Oken, What to Tell
Cancer Patients, 175 J.A.M.A. 1120 (1961).
273 See note 263 supra.
274 Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney
Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 357, 382 (1968).
275 W. PROSSER, supra note 261, § 32, at 340.
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tion, and that refusal to abort is simply the exercise of sound
medical judgment. The patient-particularly if she is in the
early stages of pregnancy, and the doctor is employed by a
state or city institution-might counter that the physician's
refusal to abort violates her constitutional right to control her
own body, as established in Roe v. Wade.27 6 However, the Wade
decision was rooted not only in the right of a woman to control
her body, but also in the freedom of the physician "to deter-
mine . . . that, in his medical judgment, the patient's preg-
nancy should be terminated. 277 When the physician deter-
mines otherwise, it appears that the patient cannot compel
him solely on the grounds that she has a constitutional right
to abort an unwanted fetus. 278 Indeed, subsequent to the Wade
decision, one writer suggested that doctors "can be prosecuted
if they perform abortions conflicting with [their best medical
or clinical] judgment.
279
B. The Genetically Imperfect Child as Plaintiff
It seems quite certain that with further advances in
genetics, our concept of human rights, and our con-
cern with the quality of life, we will be enriched with
a new right; that of being born without the handicap
of a readily preventable serious genetic defect.
-Editorial, New England Journal of Medicine
280
While American law recognizes the existence of a cause
of action for wrongful death, 281 the courts have yet to hold
that life, too, can be wrongful and hence compensable. A cause
of action for wrongful life was first raised in, and rejected by,
276 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
277 Id. at 163. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
278 This problem is not mooted by the fact that the woman can procure a substitute
physician, for that will require time, during which the woman may have progressed
from the econd trimester of pregnancy to the third trimester. If this happens, the state
then may prohibit her from terminating her pregnancy, unless the substitute physician
feels that an abortion is "necessary ... for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother." Id. at 163-65.
279 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 922
n.22 (1973).
280 Editorial, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 799, 800 (197 1).
281 In most states, the remedy for wrongful death has been statutorily created. W.
PROSSER, supra note 261, § 127. See also 39 IOWA L. REV. 494 (1954).
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an Illinois court of appeals in 1963 in Zepeda v. Zepeda.2 2 In
that case, an infant brought suit against his father, seeking dam-
ages for the stigma of being born illegitimately and for being
deprived of a normal home, life, legal father, and rights of in-
heritance. The court acknowledged that "the elements of a
willful tort are presented by the allegations of the complaint,' 28 3
but nevertheless denied recovery because of its fear of open-
ing the floodgates to a new form of litigation:
What does disturb us is the nature of the new action
and the related suits which would be encouraged ....
One might seek damages for being born of a certain
color, another because of race; one for being born
with a hereditary disease, another for inheriting un-
fortunate family characteristics .... 284
Two years later, a similar action arose in New York. In
Williams v. State,285 an infant sued a state hospital for negli-
gently allowing her mother to be raped in an unattended
mental ward. The complaint sought damages for deprivation
of "property rights . . . a normal childhood and home life ...
proper parental care, support and rearing," as well as for being
"caused to bear the stigma of illegitimacy. '286 In affirming
282 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
2 8
3 Id. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.2 84 Id. at 259-60, 190 N.E.2d at 858. One commentator has noted that the conse-
quences feared by the Zepeda court may have been misapprehended. See Capron, supra
note 270, at 236:
But opening the court to the infant Zepeda would not necessarily open it to the
others cited by the court, for poverty, race and genetic makeup do not constitute
"moral wrong(s) and . . . criminal act(s)" which the court held Mr. Zepeda's
sexual relations with the plaintiff's mother to be. Being poor or carrying an
hereditary disease are not crimes; procreating in these circumstances violates
no legal right of the child conceived.
285 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 907, 269
N.Y.S. 2d 786, aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
286 46 Misc. 2d at 825, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 954. The trial judge, in upholding the suffi-
ciency of the complaint, noted his "disinclination to approve the appellation: 'a cause
of action for wrongful life,'" and stated that it was for the appellate court to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff had a cause of action and what it should be called. Id. at
830, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 959. The Appellate Division dismissed the claim largely on the
grounds that damages were not ascertainable:
In essence, and regardless of the verbiage of the claim above quoted, the
damages asserted rest upon the very fact of conception and would have to com-
prehend the infirmities inherent in claimant's situation as against the alterna-
tives of a void, if nonbirth and nonexistence may thus be expressed; and could
not, without incursion into the metaphysical, be measured against the hypoth-
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the Appellate Division's dismissal of the claim, the New York
Court of Appeals held:
Impossibility of entertaining this suit comes not
so much from the difficulty in measuring the alleged
"damages" as from the absence from our legal con-
cepts of any such idea as a "wrong" to a later born
child caused by permitting a woman to be violated
and to bear an out-of-wedlock infant. . . . Being born
under one set of circumstances rather than another
or to one pair of parents rather than another is not
a suable wrong that is cognizable in court.
287
The following year, a Florida appellate court held that
to recognize such a claim would be to ignore "our understand-
ing of both the laws of men and the laws of nature.
'288
Finally, Gleitman v. Cosgrove289 arose in a context which
is closely analogous to any wrongful life litigation which might
result from failure to perform an amniocentesis or failure
to inform of defects discovered through prenatal diagnosis.
In that case, Mrs. Gleitman informed her physician during
early pregnancy that she had recently recovered from an ill-
ness diagnosed as German measles. Upon the advice of her
doctor, she continued her pregnancy; she subsequently gave
birth to a child who was blind, deaf, and mentally retarded.
The mother, father, and child brought suit, alleging malprac-
tice through failure to inform Mrs. Gleitman that her preg-
nancy was at risk. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of
the complaint, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, on the au-
thority of Zepeda and Williams, held that the infant's "action
for 'wrongful life'" did "not give rise to damages cognizable
at law. '290 The court based its decision as to the child on the
impossibility of determining damages:
esis of a child or imagined entity in some way identifiable with claimant but of
normal and lawful parentage and possessed of normal or average advantages.
25 App. Div. 2d at 907, 908, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
287 18 N.Y.2d at 484, 223 N.E.2d at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887. Judge Keating's
concurrence was based "not ... upon any fear of creating a new cause of a tion or the
fact that the child was not in being when the alleged tortious act occurred or upon ...
a misguided fear of the possible ramifications of a decision permitting recovery," but in-
stead on the impossibility of ascertaining damages. Id. at 484-85, 223 N.E.2d at 344-45,
276 N.Y.S.2d at 888 (Keating, J., concurring).
s8s Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52, 4 (Fla. App. 1967).
289 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
290 Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF AMNIOCENTESIS
The infant plaintiff would have us measure the dif-
ference between his life with defects against the utter
void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make
such a determination .... By asserting that he should
not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it
logically impossible for a court to measure his al-
leged damages because of the impossibility of mak-
ing the comparison required by compensatory rem-
edies.
29 1
The dismissal of the parents' claims was founded on a policy
against abortions. Citing Theocritus and Jonathan Swift, the
court rested its holding on its "felt intuition of human nature"
that if the infant "could have been asked as to whether his
life should be snuffed out before his full term of gestation
could run its course . . . he would almost surely choose life
with defects as against no life at all."
'2 92
The Supreme Court's recent abortion decision 293 may
reverse the judiciary's reluctance to recognize actions for
wrongful life in prenatal diagnosis situations. The holding
in Gleitman was predicated, in large measure, on judicial antip-
athy for "genetic abortion" and a desire to preserve "[t]he right
to life [which] is inalienable in our society. '294 Such a position
is no longer tenable after Roe v. Wade. In fact, there have been
recent reports of conduct extending beyond Wade: Physicians,
after receiving consent from parents, have refrained from
performing lifesaving surgery on severely defective neonates,
allowing them to die during the first few months of life.
2 95 If
291 Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
292 Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693. See also Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58
Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), aff'd mem. as modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313
N.Y.S.2d 502, appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d 804, 264 N.E.2d 354, 315 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970),
which was a malpractice action arising from a doctor's refusal to perform an abortion
on a woman who had been ill with rubella during early pregnancy and who subsequently
gave birth to a defective child. The Appellate Division, in affirming the trial court's
dismissal of the action, held that abortion was against public policy, and that any con-
trary decision would have to come from the legislature.
293 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
294 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
29 See Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nurseiy, 289
NEw ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973):
Of 299 consecutive deaths occurring in [the Yale University Hospital] special-
care nursery, 43 (14 per cent) were related to withholding treatment. In this
group were 14 with multiple anomalies, eight with trisomy, eight with cardio-
pulmonary disease, seven with meningomyelocele, three with other central-
nervous system disorders, and two with short-bowel syndrome. After careful
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this indicates that our society will now tolerate a balancing of
the quality of life against the sanctity of life, the court's anti-
abortion policy against wrongful life actions may have lost
much of its force.
Moreover, there are recent cases which uphold a parental
right of recovery for expenses of rearing an unwanted but
healthy child. In Troppi v. Scarf,296 a druggist negligently dis-
pensed a tranquilizer, in lieu of prescribed birth control pills,
to a woman who already had seven children. A healthy child
was born, and the parents sued for the mother's lost wages,
pain and anxiety, medical and hospital expenses, and the
economic costs of raising the child. The lower court held the
demands to be against public policy, 297 but the Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that the pharmacist's negligence
was the proximate cause of the birth, and that giving birth
to an unwanted child was a compensable plight. Troppi and
decisions recognizing that there is a cause of action for neg-
ligent sterilization which results in the birth of unwanted off-
spring298 are not direct authority for the recognition of wrong-
ful life actions, but they do provide judicial support for the
principle that the birth of a child is not always an unmixed
blessing, and may be compensable at law.
Futhermore, a "wrongful life" action will not always be
based on the allegation that the defective child should have
been aborted. Some genetic disorders are partially amenable
to prenatal treatment. 299 In others, prenatal diagnosis can
facilitate immediate post-natal therapy.300 There is no reason
of law or policy for denying a remedy to a defective child
consideration of each of these 43 infants, parents and physicians in a group de-
cision concluded that prognosis for meaningful life was extremely poor or hope-
less, and therefore rejected further treatment. The awesome finality of these
decisions, combined with a potential for error in prognosis, made the choice ago-
nizing for families and health professionals. Nevertheless, the issue has to be
faced, for not to decide is an arbitrary and potentially devastating decision of
default.
See also Shaw, Dilemmas of "Informed Consent" in Children, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 885
(1973), which indicates that the practice at the University of Virginia Medical Center
is similar.
296 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
297 Troppi v. Scarf, Civ. No. 53523 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., Mar. 24, 1969).
298 See, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Jackson v.
Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970).
299 See notes 49-52 supra & accompanying text.
.0 See notes 46-48 supra & accompanying text.
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whose disorder could have been alleviated had it only been
prenatally diagnosed.
For example, in Sylvia v. Gobeille,301 a defective child
brought suit against a physician for negligently failing to pre-
scribe gamma globulin for her mother, who had been exposed
to German measles during pregnancy. The Supreme Court
of Rhode Island held that the child did have a right of action
against the physician, and remanded the case for trial on the
issue whether the physician's failure to prescribe was the prox-
imate cause of the plaintiff's injury. In so holding, the court
stated:
"[J]ustice requires that the principle be recognized
that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound
mind and body," and that "If the wrongful conduct
interferes with that right, and it can be established
by competent proof that there is a causal connection be-
tween the wrongful interference and the harm suf-
fered by the child when born, damages for such harm
should be recoverable by the child.
'30 2
It is clear from Sylvia that a child with a disorder which
is prenatally diagnosable and treatable has a legally cogniz-
able claim against a physician who negligently fails to diagnose
or treat the disorder. In such a case, the measure of damages
would be based not on the comparison between a disadvan-
taged life and no life at all, but instead on a contrast between
a disadvantaged life and a healthy one.
The second ground for judicial reluctance to sustain
"wrongful life" actions-the difficulty of ascertaining dam-
ages-should not be an insurmountable obstacle. If the dif-
ficulty is based on the notion that any life, no matter how
painful, is of some benefit to the plaintiff, damages could be
determined by measuring the value of that benefit, and sub-
tracting that amount from the emotional and physical cost to
plaintiff of enduring such a life.30 3 This is what the courts
would do if a physician performed lifesaving surgery on an
301 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966).
302 Id. at 224 (citation omitted).
= Restatement of Torts § 920 (1939):
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff [and]
... has conferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was
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adult, but in the course of the surgery negligently injured
the patient for life.3" 4 The fact that this could not be done
with mathematical precision should not be a bar to recovery.
The courts have long recognized that
[w]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude
the ascertainment of the amount of damages with
certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental
principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured
person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from mak-
ing any amend for his acts. 0 5
Thus neither judicial enmity toward abortion nor the
difficulty of ascertaining damages presents a cogent reason
for denying recovery for wrongful life. There exist, however,
two dangers in the creation of such a cause of action. First,
judicial recognition of wrongful life actions might induce some
physicians to abort all "borderline fetuses" (both those whose
karyotypes or biochemical patterns are ambiguous and those
whose prenatal diagnoses reveal simply a minimal genetic de-
fect), because only by so doing could they immunize themselves
from the possibility of wrongful life suits. This fear would be
misplaced, of course; the better course would be full disclos-
ure and parental decision. Second, judicial recognition that
genetic disadvantage is a compensable plight could, when
coupled with the increasing use of amniocentesis and selec-
tive abortion, help create a societal attitude that only pristine
pure "health" is tolerable. Such an attitude would generate
disdain for genetic defectives and would exert pressure on
parents to opt for abortion when confronted with the likeli-
hood of a genetically disadvantaged child.30 6 A cogent policy
justification for the continued dismissal of wrongful life actions
is the possible societal acceptance of the belief that if the life
of a genetically defective human being is wrongful, then only
harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of
damages, where this is equitable.
See also Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 255, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971); 50 MINN.
L. REv. 593, 599 (1966).
304 See Capron, Informed Decisionmaking in Genetic Counseling: A Dissent to the "Wrong-
Jul Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581, 597 n.59 (1973).
'0- Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
30 See notes 111-15 supra & accompanying text.
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his death can be rightful. A societal intolerance for the ge-
netically disabled, however, would be caused only partially
by the judicial creation of wrongful life actions; these attitudes,
if they do come to exist, would primarily be the result of the
availability and increasing use of amniocentesis and genetic
abortion themselves.
It seems likely that Roe v. Wade, coupled with a shift in
social attitudes concerning abortion and the sanctity of life,
will cause a reversal in the courts' negative attitudes toward
wrongful life suits. Indeed, once one accepts the propriety
of abortion as a "cure" for genetic disease, a wrongful life
action seems almost indistinguishable from any other type
of action brought by an infant for injuries sustained during
its period of gestation.
30 7
IV. CONCLUSION
As Aldous Huxley's fantasy from the 1930's308 merges
into tomorrow's reality, the science of human genetics con-
tinues to forge its virtually uncontrolled path beyond our som-
nolent legal institutions. The development of amniocentesis
is one example of a scientific advance which promises to pro-
vide not only medical and social assistance but also litigative
and legislative entanglements.
It does seem clear that lawmakers must be made aware
of and begin to address themselves to advances in human
genetics. To understand the importance of this problem, one
need only recall past achievements in the physical sciences
and the corresponding lag of our legal institutions.30 9 As au-
thor-physicist C. P. Snow recently admonished:
People are already [thinking about the ramifications
of prenatal diagnosis and genetic engineering] ....
They are telling us we ought to make some legalistic
preparations in advance. It won't do us any harm to
3 7 See, e.g., Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Smith v. Brennan,
31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
308 A. HuxLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
309 See, e.g., A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND
DOSSIERS (1971); Estep & Forgotson, Legal Liability for Genetic Injuries from Radiation,
24 LA. L. REV. 1 (1963); A Symposium on Communications Satellites: Modern Challenge to
Traditional Doctrine, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 215 (1963).
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take note, and to have a few elementary considera-
tions in mind.
First, if this thing is ever possible technologically,
it will happen. It is no use expecting international
agreements to stop it, or a self-denying ordinance
among scientists. In fact, most of us, if the power
were given us, would be morally confused. For the
first application of genetic engineering almost cer-
tainly would be to eradicate the grosser genetic mis-
instructions-that is the prescriptions that produce
dystonia or spina bifida or mongoloidism or other
fearful forms of human suffering. If you had the
power, wouldn't you do that? I would, whatever the
consequences. If society had that power and wouldn't
use it, I should feel like Ivan Karamozov returning
his ticket.
The consequences though, would be inescapable.
310
310 Snow, Human Care, 225 J.A.M.A. 617, 620 (1973).
